Syngenta, Stephenson and the Federal Judicial Injunctive Power by Hoffman, Lonny Sheinkopf
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Syngenta, Stephenson and the Federal Judicial
Injunctive Power
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hoffman, Lonny Sheinkopf (2004) "Syngenta, Stephenson and the Federal Judicial Injunctive Power," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 37 : Iss. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/1
HOFFMAN3.DOC 5/14/2004 10:29 AM 
 
605 
SYNGENTA, STEPHENSON AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
INJUNCTIVE POWER 
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two terms, the United States Supreme Court has heard 
oral argument in two cases with important implications for complex 
litigation.  The two cases—Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson1 
and Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson2—raised distinctive legal issues 
but both fundamentally concerned the problem of federal judicial power 
to enjoin litigants from pursuing state proceedings after a federal 
judgment has been rendered.  In Syngenta, the Court resoundingly 
rejected use of the All Writs Act to enjoin an infringing state case by 
removing it to federal court.  In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed that, in 
appropriate cases, an injunction may issue to enjoin prosecution of state 
suits after federal judgment. 
By sharp contrast, Stephenson, which involved a collateral attack 
on a prior federal class action certification ruling, left the justices evenly 
divided (with Justice Stevens having recused himself) and the scope of 
federal judicial injunctive power in this class action context undefined.  
It would be a mistake, however, to treat the case lightly.  Though 
technically a non-decision, Stephenson unmistakably signals a 
willingness by four justices to proscribe collateral attacks on a federal 
court’s prior judgment in a case, even when the attack is brought by 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  I am grateful to Susan 
Koniak and Henry Monaghan for their feedback on an earlier draft of this article.  Thanks also to 
Darci Deltorto and the rest of the editors of the Akron Law Review for organizing this symposium.  
The University of Houston Foundation provided financial support for this project.  Finally, a note of 
full disclosure is in order.  On behalf of the State of Texas, I filed, pro bono, an amicus brief in 
support of the respondent in the Syngenta case.  My interest in the case originated with an article I 
had previously written several years earlier.  See Lonny S. Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the 
All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1999). 
 1. 537 U.S. 28 (2002). 
 2. 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
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persons who did not participate in the case and who argued that they 
were not adequately represented by those who did.  The implications of 
this signal are profound: if the position of this plurality commands only 
one more member of the Court, it would mean for the class action 
context a vastly greater federal judicial authority to enjoin collateral 
attacks brought in the state forum. 
This paper takes up the question of the limits of a federal court’s 
authority post-Syngenta and -Stephenson to enjoin litigants from 
prosecuting state suits brought concurrently with an ongoing federal case 
or after a federal judgment has been handed down.  In particular, my 
objectives are three-fold.  As regards Syngenta, I will examine the case’s 
background and procedural history to highlight the strategic decision-
making and forum shopping decisions made by all of the parties and 
their lawyers in the contest.  Also, by revisiting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the case, I hope to offer a better perspective on what the 
justices did decide and, correspondingly, also reflect on what they did 
not decide.  Even as Syngenta nodded in recognition that some power 
exists to enjoin state proceedings, its ambit was left undefined.  
Recognizing the scope of the Court’s decision is critical if any insight is 
to be gained into the import the decision bears on the limits of the 
federal judicial injunctive power. 
My second objective concerns Stephenson.  Like the earlier study 
of Syngenta, the examination of Stephenson will also consider the case’s 
background and procedural history.  Because there ultimately was no 
decision by a majority of the Court in the case, Part II of this paper more 
carefully parses the intermediate appellate court’s opinion, along with 
the positions advanced by the parties and their amici before the United 
States Supreme Court.  Examining the arguments in this manner helps to 
frame the parameters of the debate over federal injunctive power as it 
arose in the Stephenson context. 
Finally, Part III considers, in the aftermath of Syngenta and 
Stephenson, the future battles we should expect over the use of the civil 
injunctive power by federal judges to restrain state litigants.  In 
considering the legal questions likely on the near horizon, we will also 
discover the most important and revealing connection between these 
ostensibly unrelated cases.  Read together, Syngenta and Stephenson 
suggest that what is at stake in articulating the limits of federal judicial 
injunctive power to enjoin coordinate state proceedings is not only the 
accommodation of competing sovereign interests but also the evaluation 
of strategic decision-making by litigants and its influence on judicial 
decision-making.  If Syngenta reminds us that litigants may sometimes 
2
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invoke the state courts to try to game the system in inappropriate ways, 
Stephenson reflects that without proper safeguards and review even 
federal judgments may be called into doubt.  Put another way, the cases 
indicate that the problem of legitimacy can be bilateral.  A recent study 
by Thomas Willging and Shannon Wheatman for the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) bolsters this conclusion.  They found that, on the whole, 
state and federal judges handle class litigation in approximately the same 
manner, in terms of how frequently certification is granted (whether for 
trial or for settlement) as well as in their rulings on dispositive pretrial 
motions.3  These findings suggest that there is no valid basis for 
presuming federal judges will be more fair or efficient in their treatment 
of complex case litigation than state judges.  At the same time, the FJC’s 
findings cut across all courts and should not be read to mask that 
particular judges—or multiple judges in a particular region—may fail to 
properly evaluate and manage cases that are before them.  By directing 
sharper focus on this evaluative responsibility judges bear, our study of 
Syngenta and Stephenson may bring us closer to a better conception of 
preclusion law and a more unified framework for defining the limits of 
and appropriate tolerance for “jurisdictional redundancy,” as Bob Cover 
once put it, in our peculiar system of courts with overlapping 
jurisdiction.4 
I.  SYNGENTA 
A. In the Beginning 
The origins of the Court’s decision in Syngenta may be traced to 
Iberville Parish, Louisiana.  It was there that Hurley Henson and several 
other plaintiffs (the “Henson plaintiffs”) sought recovery from the 
chemical manufacturer Ciba-Geigy Corporation (renamed Syngenta 
Crop Protection, Inc. by the time certiorari was granted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court) for damages sustained as a result of their exposure to an 
insecticide manufactured and sold by the company.  The only problem 
was that the Henson plaintiffs had previously been plaintiffs in a prior 
lawsuit filed against the same defendant in the United States District 
 
 3. Thomas E. Willging and Shannon R. Wheatman, ATTORNEY REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF 
AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES REGARDING A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF 
ATTORNEYS (April 2004).  A copy of the full report may be accessed through the link www.fjc.gov.   
 4. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest Ideology and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981). 
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Court for the Southern District of Alabama.5  Indeed, not only had the 
Henson plaintiffs been plaintiffs in the federal case, Price v. Ciba-Geigy 
Corp., but they had even opted into a settlement where, in exchange for 
monetary payment by the company, they agreed to dismiss with 
prejudice their claims against the chemical company.6  Yet, after 
depositing their settlement checks and dutifully signing the settlement 
agreement, the Henson plaintiffs directed their counsel to assert new 
claims against the same defendant in a Louisiana state court.7 
There are two sides to every story, of course, and the Henson 
plaintiffs’ was that when they sought to litigate again in state court they 
were seeking relief for a different injury: namely, exposure to Atrazine, 
not the chlorodimeform-based insecticide known as Galecron that was at 
issue in the Price litigation.  On this fine distinction, the Henson 
plaintiffs argued that they were asserting claims for relief which were 
not disposed of by the federal settlement.  They insisted that the 
company did not negotiate a settlement of all claims but that resolution 
covered only claims relating to exposure to Galecron, the particular 
chemical that was the subject of the federal litigation. 
The state court judge apparently was persuaded by the distinction, 
though it has been suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel “successfully 
misled” the judge.8  Whether by guile or otherwise, the Henson plaintiffs 
received an invitation from the state judge to amend the state petition to 
make plain that the claims they were bringing arose solely from their 
exposure to Atrazine and, therefore, were not barred by the federal 
settlement. 
 
 5. To be precise, Henson was one of the named plaintiffs in the Iberville Parish suit that was 
filed as a class action on behalf of all individuals whom Ciba-Geigy employed at its St. Gabriel, 
Louisiana, facility.  Filed on September 15, 1993, this suit preceded the filing of the case that was 
certified eventually by Judge Butler in the Southern District of Alabama.  See Brief of Petitioner at 
*2, Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (No. 01-757), available at 2002 WL 
956371 (noting that the federal case began as a separate state suit in Mobile County, Alabama, and 
was properly removed to federal district court on January 30, 1995).  Before any class was certified 
by the Louisiana state judge, Henson and other Louisiana residents employed at the defendant’s St. 
Gabriel facility decided to suspend their state court action and try, instead, to intervene in the 
federal litigation.  It was only after the federal settlement that Henson and the other intervenors 
returned to state court and sought to reopen the state proceedings to seek further relief against Ciba-
Geigy (n.k.a. Syngenta). 
 6. Judgment was then entered approving the settlement under Rule 23 by Judge Butler, the 
presiding judge in Price. 
 7. The Henson plaintiffs also named several individual defendants in their state court suit.  It 
was the presence of these individual defendants that destroyed the diversity of citizenship that 
otherwise existed between plaintiffs and Syngenta and, thereby, necessitated the company’s reliance 
on the All Writs Act to attempt to remove the otherwise unremovable case. 
 8. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 2001). 
4
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Rather unhappy with their luck before the state trial judge, the 
chemical company (and the three individual defendants also named in 
the suit) removed the state court case to the Middle District of Louisiana, 
relying principally on the All Writs Act and the assertion that the state 
court action threatened to interfere with the prior federal judgment which 
had approved the settlement and dismissed all claims against the 
company.  Transfer was then immediately requested under 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a) to the Southern District of Alabama and, though the record is 
silent on how they accomplished this, the skillful lawyers for the 
chemical company also succeeded in getting the case back before Judge 
Butler.9  Once there, the defendants fared far better in their argument 
that the Henson plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on the grounds 
that all such claims had already been settled and dismissed.  Indeed, so 
incensed was Judge Butler by the actions taken in Iberville Parish after 
the settlement, that once the Henson plaintiffs were back before him he 
not only dismissed their case with prejudice but he also imposed a 
sanction of $27,000 against counsel to cover the defendants’ legal fees in 
enforcing the federal settlement. 
Stymied from pursuing the state court action, the Henson plaintiffs 
and their counsel appealed the dismissal and the sanctions order, 
respectively, to the Eleventh Circuit.  The appellate court began by 
readily affirming the sanctions order against plaintiffs’ counsel.  The 
Henson plaintiffs’ lawyer had argued that the federal judge had no 
further jurisdiction to sanction him since the case was already dismissed.  
Not so, the Eleventh Circuit intoned, since he was counsel of record in 
the federal action and it was within the court’s power to sanction him for 
interfering with carrying out the settlement terms, citing Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc.10  It also bears noting that the Henson plaintiffs could not 
have argued that the federal district judge lacked power to enjoin  them 
 
 9. Section 1404 authorizes transfer between districts but does not give defendants the 
authority to select a particular judge in the transferee federal district.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
(stating “a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might 
have been brought”).  It is possible, of course, that by the luck of the draw the case ended up back in 
front of the federal judge who oversaw the federal class settlement.  It is more likely, though, that 
defendants successfully brought the case before Judge Butler by asserting that the 
removed/transferred action was related to the Price case previously before him and that the 
governing local rules permitted assignment back to the presiding judge of that case.  See S.D. ALA. 
LOCAL R 3.3, available at http://www.als.uscourts.gov/district-court/ forms/local-rules.pdf. (“If the 
Civil Cover Sheet . . . indicates that the civil action in which it is filed is related to another action or 
actions pending in this district, the action shall be assigned to the district judge before whom the 
related action with the lowest file number is pending or as may be otherwise determined by the chief 
judge.”). 
 10. See Henson, 261 F.3d. at 1068 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991)). 
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from filing suit in Louisiana because as intervenors into the federal 
litigation the court had in personam jurisdiction over them.  Yet, as 
Henry Monaghan has noted, jurisdiction will often be an important 
barrier to the issuance of an anti-suit injunction, restricting a federal 
court’s power to enjoin nonresident plaintiffs who lack the requisite 
contacts with the forum in which the federal court is located.11  We will 
return to this issue again in Part III. 
While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s authority to 
sanction the Henson plaintiffs’ counsel, it found that the federal district 
judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Henson plaintiffs’ state 
case and that resorting to the All Writs Act did not cure the jurisdictional 
defect.12  Central to the court’s conclusion were two principles: first, that 
§1441(a) authorizes removal only of civil actions “of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction;” and, second, that 
“the All Writs Act does not provide an independent basis of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.”13  Because the All Writs Act could not be 
relied upon to fill the absence of original jurisdiction, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that removal of the Henson plaintiff’s state case was 
not authorized. 
B. Before the Fall 
When the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district judge and ordered 
the case remanded, it was only the second court of appeals to find a 
subject matter jurisdiction defect in basing removal on the All Writs 
Act.14  Every other circuit court and nearly all district courts to consider 
the question had concluded that the All Writs Act could be invoked as a 
residual basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the removed case 
which otherwise lacked an independent basis for remaining in federal 
 
 11. Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunction and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident 
Class Members, 98 COLUM. L REV. 1148, 1148 (1998).  See also infra note 14. 
 12. Henson, 261 F.3d at 1070-71. 
 13. Id. at 1070 (citing, inter alia, Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999) (affirming All 
Writs Act does not contain independent grant of original jurisdiction); Lonny S. Hoffman, Removal 
Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 433-39 (1999) (discussing history of All 
Writs Act)). 
 14. The only other circuit court to do so was Hillman v. Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that the All Writs Act does not allow a court to acquire jurisdiction over a party 
otherwise not subject to its jurisdiction).  Indeed, for that matter, only two district courts had ever 
concluded that the All Writs Act could not be used to remove an otherwise unremovable case.  See, 
e.g., Fidelity Fin. v. Robinson, 971 F. Supp. 244, 249 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (holding that the “All Writs 
Act is not a jurisdictional blank check” for removal, but can only be used for exceptional 
circumstances); In re Successor Liab. Claims Against Bairnco Corp., 837 F. Supp. 176, 177 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1993) (holding that “the All Writs Act is not a source of federal question jurisdiction”). 
6
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court.15  Yet, despite the widespread acceptance of using § 1651a as an 
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the procedural 
maneuver was of relatively recent vintage.  The All Writs Act dates back 
to the First Judiciary Act of 1789, but it was not until 1988 that the 
Second Circuit, in Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers,16 first 
approved the use of the All Writs Act to remove an otherwise 
unremovable case. 
The next case to approve an All Writs Act removal—and, in fact, 
the decision that was cited by other courts far more often than Yonkers 
as supporting prior precedent17—was also a Second Circuit decision.18  
Notably, this decision was part of the same sprawling Agent Orange 
litigation that produced the appeal in Stephenson a decade later.  This 
marks  the most patent connection between the Sygnenta and Stephenson 
cases: it was the Second Circuit’s decision in Ivy/Hartman II that blazed 
the precedential trail authorizing the expanded use of the All Writs Act 
as an independent basis of removal authority, a trail that ultimately was 
cut short by the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Syngenta.  It 
also bears noting that the All Writs Act removal question also arose 
directly in the appeal in Stephenson, insofar as one of the two cases 
consolidated in the Stephenson appeal (the Issacson case) was only 
removed to federal court—despite the absence of complete diversity or a 
 
 15. See Bylinski v. City of Allen Park, 169 F.3d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
removal is proper under the All Writs Act), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1037 (1999); NAACP v. Metro. 
Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Metropolitan Council II] (same), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998); NAACP v. Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter Metropolitan Council I] (same), vacated by 522 U.S. 1145, and aff’d by Metropolitan 
Council II, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998); In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 
1996) (same); Sable v. Gen. Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Agent 
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d, 1425, 1431 (2d Cir. 1993) (same) [hereinafter Agent Orange 
II]; United States v. City of New York, 972 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); Yonkers Racing 
Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 865 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); N.Y. State Laborers Political 
Action Comm. v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council, No. 97-CV-1731, 1998 WL 146248, at *5 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998) (same); Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (same); Chance v. Sullivan, 993 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Atlantic Coast 
Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 988 F. Supp. 486, 492 (D.N.J. 1997) 
(same); Harbor Venture, Inc. v. Nichols, 934 F. Supp. 322, 324 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (same); Holmes v. 
Trustmark Nat’l Bank, No. CIV.A. 195CV 323 GR, 1996 WL 904513, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 11, 
1996) (same); Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., Nos. 93-1683, 94-2391 & 94-3087, 1994 WL 507801, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1994) (same); Neuman v. Goldberg, 159 B.R. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(same); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Nowling v. Aero 
Servs. Int’l., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 733, 738 (E.D. La. 1990) (same). 
 16. 858 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 17. See Hoffman, supra note 13 (listing cases that relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Agent Orange). 
 18. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir 1993). 
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federal question appearing on the face of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded 
complaint—on the assertion that the federal district judge that approved 
the Agent Orange class action settlement retained residual authority 
under the All Writs Act to remove any case that threatened to interfere 
with the judgment approving that settlement.  While the Court’s terse 
per curiam opinion in Stephenson said nothing of substance on the issue 
for which certiorari was granted, it did remand the consolidated 
Isaacson case to state court in light of its previous decision in 
Syngenta.19 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s nullification of the practice in 
Syngenta, courts that had relied on the All Writs Act to uphold a 
defendant’s removal of an otherwise unremovable case had done so 
either because a prior federal judgment was found to be preclusive of 
subsequently filed state claims or because a subsequently filed suit 
allegedly threatened to interfere with a prior federal judgment or 
ongoing federal proceedings.20  Henson was an example of the former: 
the district court in the Southern District of Alabama upheld the removal 
of the state court action filed in Iberville Parish, Louisiana, after 
concluding that it was precluded by a settlement previously approved by 
the federal district court in related proceedings.  To justify removal, 
proponents would argue that the All Writs Act provided the independent 
basis of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The main difficulty with the argument that the All Writs Act, 
standing alone, could serve as an independent basis of subject matter 
jurisdiction is that it ran contrary to a well-established and long line of 
precedents that the All Writs Act could not serve as an independent basis 
of original subject matter jurisdiction.21  The lack of original jurisdiction 
 
 19. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111, 111 (2003) (“With respect to 
respondents Joe Isaacson and Phyllis Lisa Isaacson, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of 
Syngenta . . . .”). 
 20. Hoffman, supra note 13, at 19. 
 21. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1999).  “While the All Writs Act 
authorizes employment of extraordinary writs, . . . the express terms of the Act confine the power of 
the CAAF to issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutory jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge 
that jurisdiction.”  Id.  Furthermore, § 1651(a) may be used only for “filling the interstices of federal 
judicial power when those gaps threatened to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’ 
jurisdiction.”  Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41 (1985). 
It has been too frequently decided in this court to require the citation of cases that the 
circuit courts of the United States have no jurisdiction in original cases of mandamus, 
and have only power to issue such writs in aid of their jurisdiction in cases already 
pending, wherein jurisdiction has been acquired by other means and by other process. 
Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U.S. 109, 110 (1906). 
8
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based solely on the All Writs Act was a significant problem for 
proponents of removal under the statute since in the general removal 
provision, 28 U.S.C. §1441, Congress has authorized removal only of 
civil actions of which the federal court would have had “original 
jurisdiction” had suit been initiated there.22  And while it is certainly true 
that Congress can decide to authorize removal without conferring 
original jurisdiction on the federal courts (indeed, it has done so on 
several occasions23), there is no indication that Congress has done so in 
the All Writs Act.  Ultimately, it was this absence of original jurisdiction 
and the Court’s willingness in its decision in Syngenta to defer to 
Congress to define the scope of removal authority that formed the 
principal ground on which the Court rejected reliance on the All Writs 
Act to justify removal of an otherwise unremovable case.24 
Unable to rely upon the statute as an independent source of original 
jurisdiction and sensing, perhaps, the futility of trying to do so, 
proponents of All Writs Act removal developed a second argument to 
justify removal.  They argued that § 1651a could be invoked to remove a 
case even when an independent basis of original jurisdiction was lacking 
so long as the court had previously possessed original jurisdiction in a 
case and was now using the All Writs Act as an exercise of its “ancillary 
 
 22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  See also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) 
(“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to 
federal court by the defendant.”); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840 (1989) (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) for the general proposition that “‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by 
Act of Congress, a case is not properly removed to federal court unless it might have been brought 
there originally”). 
 23. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (allowing removal of civil or criminal suits and without regard 
to whether the claims arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or the 
diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 have been satisfied); 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (same); 28 
U.S.C. § 1443 (allowing removal of an action seeking to enforce a right under any law providing for 
equal civil rights); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n, 489 U.S. at 841 (holding state tax case against 
Indian tribe was improperly removed where federal district court lacked original jurisdiction over 
the case and observing: “[t]he jurisdictional question in this case is not affected by the fact that 
tribal immunity is governed by federal law. . . . Congress has expressly provided by statute for 
removal when it desired federal courts to adjudicate defenses based on federal immunities.”). 
 24. See Syngenta Crop Prod., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 29, 33 (2002) (noting that 
“[b]ecause the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, it cannot confer the 
original jurisdiction required to support removal pursuant to § 1441”).  The Eleventh Circuit 
similarly had rejected the defendants’ argument for relying exclusively on the All Writs Act to 
justify removal, characterizing it as using the statute as “jurisdictional caulk” used to plug “the 
cracks in federal jurisdiction through which crafty litigants can escape the effect of a federal order.”  
Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001).  Such an argument, even if 
“tempting,” “goes too far,” the Eleventh Circuit ruled.  Id. at 1071.  “Too elastic an interpretation of 
the All Writs Act perverts it from a tool for effectuating Congress’s intent in conferring jurisdiction 
on the lower federal courts into a device for judically reequilibrating a state-federal balance that is 
Congress’s to strike.”  Id. 
9
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jurisdiction” or “ancillary enforcement jurisdiction” to protect its 
jurisdiction or prior judgment.  This, in fact, was the central argument on 
which Syngenta relied in its arguments before the United States Supreme 
Court.  It argued that since the federal court had original jurisdiction (on 
the basis of diversity) to certify the class and approve the settlement 
reached, it retained ancillary jurisdiction to remove the infringing state 
case to protect and effectuate its judgment approving the class action 
settlement.25  Syngenta noted that Judge Butler had included a clause in 
the judgment expressly retaining jurisdiction, satisfying the predicate 
from Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.26  As a result, they 
argued, the district judge possessed jurisdiction ancillary to its original 
jurisdiction over the case sufficient to support removal of the Henson 
plaintiffs’ Louisiana case under the All Writs Act, even though there was 
neither diversity between the parties nor a federal question appearing of 
the face of the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint.27  Syngenta argued 
that as long as the trial court included a retained jurisdiction clause in the 
judgment, it possessed ancillary jurisdiction “to vindicate its authority 
and effectuate its decrees,” which jurisdiction included the right to 
remove the infringing state action pursuant to the All Writs Act. 
C. Before the United States Supreme Court 
While the ancilliary jurisdiction argument Syngenta advanced at the 
Supreme Court enjoyed the concurrence of nearly every prior lower 
court to consider the question, the justices wasted little time in oral 
argument in expressing their skepticism for resort to the All Writs Act.28  
 
 25. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34 (distinguishing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 
U.S. 375 (1994)). 
 26. 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 
 27. In Kokkonen, the Court had said that federal courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction 
either “to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, 
factually interdependent,” or “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its 
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.”  Id. at 379-80.  The first occasion 
for ancillary jurisdiction was inapplicable in Kokkonen, just as it was on the facts of the Syngenta 
case, since the subsequent claims were brought in a separate action. 
 28. Consider the initial exchange at oral argument: 
Mr. Alsobrook (counsel for petitioner): Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In 
Kikkonen [sic] v. Guardian Life, this Court hypothesized the very situation that we 
have before you this morning because here we have a nationwide class action 
settlement where the court specifically by judgment retained jurisdiction to manage 
the settlement as well as enforce it. A critical part of that settlement was the 
dismissal of this case. However, when class counsel went to dismiss the case, as 
the Eleventh Circuit pointed out and as the district court pointed out, his efforts 
were thwarted and the case was not dismissed. 
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: Mr. Alsobrook, I see you’ve changed the question 
10
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In the absence of original jurisdiction, the justices queried, how could 
the Henson case have been removed under the All Writs Act, since the 
All Writs Act does not, standing alone, provide an independent source of 
original jurisdiction.29  Although Petitioner tried to argue that the federal 
court could borrow from the original jurisdiction it possessed in Price, 
the justices remained unconvinced that removal was appropriate where 
original jurisdiction was lacking.30 
The skepticism expressed at oral argument for allowing removal 
under the All Writs Act of a case otherwise not within the district court’s 
original jurisdiction carried over to the written decision in the case.  On 
behalf of a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the 
attempt to justify removal under the All Writs Act.  The All Writs Act 
does not, “by its specific terms, provide federal courts with an 
independent grant of jurisdiction,” Rehnquist intoned.31  Thus, 
“[b]ecause the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal 
courts, it cannot confer the original jurisdiction required to support 
removal pursuant to § 1441.”32  Moreover, the doctrine of ancillary 
enforcement jurisdiction was equally unavailing because, as Rehnquist 
noted, Defendants “fail to explain how the Alabama District Court’s 
retention of jurisdiction over the Price settlement authorized removal of 
the Henson action.”33  Removal “is governed by statute” and because no 
statute authorized removal of the Henson plaintiffs’ state case, neither 
invocation of the All Writs Act nor of a court’s “ancillary jurisdiction” 
 
presented from the time in your certiorari petition to your opening brief. And the 
question presented, when we granted, referred to 28 U.S.C., section 1441, and now 
you have dropped your reference to that. Does that mean you’re abandoning 
reliance on 1441 or simply broadening the question? 
MR. ALSOBROOK: No, sir. We—we’re saying that under 1441 that because the district 
court retained jurisdiction, that that was original jurisdiction to remove the matter, 
and that actually, Your Honor, when we removed this, they—the majority of circuit 
courts of appeals, namely the second, sixth, seventh, and eighth, had said that the 
proper vehicle to remove this was the All Writs Act. And that is what we are 
claiming today, as well as 28 U.S.C. 1367 ancillary jurisdiction, and we have set 
that out in our brief. 
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: But you have no right to remove under 1441 because 
there wasn’t complete diversity in the Louisiana suit. Isn’t that right? 
MR. ALSOBROOK: That is correct. 
QUESTION [Rehnquist, C.J.]: So you can’t rely on 1441 and that’s conceded. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at *3-4 (Oct. 15, 2002), Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 
U.S. 28 (2002) (No. 01-757), available at 2002 WL 31414640. 
 29. See id. at *7. 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 34. 
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could validate its removal.34 
Finally, and importantly, Rehnquist noted that the argument for 
ancillary jurisdiction assumed that removal was “necessary” and 
“appropriate,” as the language of § 1651a requires.35  Yet, even if Judge 
Butler retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce his judgment approving 
the class action settlement, it was neither necessary nor appropriate to 
invoke that power to remove the Henson case: “One in petitioners’ 
position may apply to the court that approved a settlement for an 
injunction requiring dismissal of a rival action.  Petitioners could also 
have sought a determination from the Louisiana state court that 
respondent’s action was barred by the judgment of the Alabama District 
Court.”36 
Because injunctive relief or the assertion of a preclusion defense 
were two available alternatives to removal, and because Congress has 
insisted that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in 
order for it to be removed from a state court, the Court affirmed the 
order of the Eleventh Circuit remanding the Henson case to state court. 
D. The Defense of Preclusion and the Availability of Injunctive Relief 
Rehnquist’s observation on the availability of seeking an injunction 
or asserting a preclusion defense before the state court raises a 
provocative question.  That question, starkly posed, is this: if these other 
options truly were available, why did the defendants choose, instead, to 
remove the case?  That the defendants had little interest in asking the 
state judge to dismiss the case on res judicata is hardly surprising: they 
may well have concluded that the forum, having been selected by the 
plaintiff, may not have been the most receptive to its argument.  Indeed, 
any concern by the defendants that their arguments would fall on deaf 
ears before the state judge certainly seems to have been validated by the 
state judge’s willingness to allow the Henson plaintiffs to proceed with 
the suit even after the federal settlement in Price.  This does not explain, 
however, why the defendants did not run to the federal district judge to 
ask for an injunction instead of removing the case. 
The likely answer is that once the option of All Writs Act removal 
appeared viable, following the Second Circuit’s decisions in Yonkers and 
Agent Orange, Syngenta’s lawyers, like many other defense counsel and 
their clients, preferred removal over seeking injunctive relief for a host 
 
 34. Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 34. 
 35. Id. at 34 n.*. 
 36. Id. 
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of strategic reasons.  First, removal is automatic: you do not have to ask 
permission to remove, and the burden is on the plaintiff to ask to remand 
the case.  In addition, the stay of state proceedings, following removal, is 
similarly automatic.  Unless and until a remand a granted, the state 
proceedings remain in abeyance.37  There is also the added complication 
of the papers to be filed in asking for an injunction and, on occasion, the 
necessity of posting a bond.  The paper requirements for removal are 
comparatively less burdensome (and there is no statutory bond 
requirement, of course, for removal).  Finally, there are doctrinal 
differences to consider, since the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 
has been interpreted as setting strict limitations on federal authority to 
enjoin state proceedings.  In her comprehensive work on the subject,38 
Joan Steinman spoke with a number of the lawyers who had removed 
cases on the basis of the All Writs Act and her summary of their remarks 
confirms that these strategic considerations help explain the preference 
for removal over injunctive relief: 
Because it is “automatic,” the stay that attends a removal is not 
proceeded by drama, contention and uncertainty over whether the court 
should enter an inter-system injunction in the particular case, and the 
parties avoid the effort and expense entailed by such contention.  
While a motion to remand may generate contention, such contention 
focuses on the propriety of the removal, rather than on the “softer” 
equitable considerations that go into the decision whether to enjoin 
other proceedings and on the notions of comity and federalism which 
make federal courts wary of enjoining state court proceedings. . . .39 
“So,” with all of these tactical advantages, Steinman summarized 
rhetorically, “why seek to enjoin when removal is available?”40   
Ultimately, of course, the Court in Syngenta rejected the 
proposition that a litigant has an equal choice between removal and 
seeking injunctive relief.  Removal, entirely a creature of legislative 
prerogative, depends (at least as far as a removal under § 1441 is 
concerned) on the assumption that a basis of original jurisdiction exists 
such that the state case could have been initially brought in federal court.  
In the absence of a federal question on the face of the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded complaint or diversity between the parties, the Southern District 
of Alabama lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Henson case and, 
 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 
 38. See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All 
Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 773, 812-13 (2000). 
 39. Id. at 813. 
 40. Id. 
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therefore, was not removable.   
Rehnquist’s opinion does recognize that Syngenta could choose 
between asserting a preclusion defense before the state judge or asking 
Judge Butler of the Southern District of Alabama to enjoin the Henson 
plaintiffs from going forward with their state court claims.  What the 
opinion does not address, however, is whether injunctive relief or a 
defense of preclusion is to be preferred in these circumstances.  No 
attempt was made to order that choice.  Nor did the Court address 
whether better justification for injunctive relief would exist as a result of 
the practical problems (as seen from the defendant’s perspective) with 
having to seek summary dismissal from the state court that had proven 
receptive to the Henson plaintiffs’ claims.  The most we can say is that 
the Court in Syngenta was agnostic as to the choice between injunctive 
relief or the assertion of a preclusion defense and unmindful of any of 
the practical problems that might prompt a party to prefer one choice 
over another. 
*  *  * 
So what did the defendants actually decide to do following the 
Court’s decision in Syngenta?  After the decision of the Court was 
handed down (though, oddly, not immediately upon notification of that 
decision), defendants petitioned Judge Butler for injunctive relief.  For 
several months, however, no action was taken by the district court on 
that request.41  Equally inexplicable has been the lack of action taken by 
the Henson plaintiffs in the state court.  Neither before nor even after 
injunctive relief was sought did plaintiffs seek to get the state judge to 
rule that their suit was not barred by the prior federal settlement.42  The 
failure to try to obtain a favorable ruling on the preclusive effect of the 
federal judgment is especially difficult to comprehend, given the 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama 
Bank.43  In Parsons Steel, the Court held that a state court’s 
determination as to the preclusive effect of a prior federal judgment 
must, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, be given full faith and credit by federal 
courts.44  Thus, if the Louisiana state court judge had ruled that the 
Henson plaintiffs’ claims were not barred by the federal settlement 
before an injunction issued, that determination would have been 
 
 41. See Civil Docket Sheet, Price v. Ciba-Geigy, Docket No. 94-cv-00647-CB . 
 42. See Civil Docket Sheet, Henson v. Ciba-Geigy, #43,620 (case filed 9/15/93) (reflecting no 
activity since November 1998); see also notes of telephone interview with Iberville County court 
clerk, December 3, 2003 (confirming same)(on file with author). 
 43. 474 U.S. 518 (1986). 
 44. Id.  The state trial court’s judgment remains subject to direct review, of course. 
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conclusive on the issue.  On November 20, 2003, however, no such 
ruling by the state court had been sought or made and Judge Butler 
granted Syngenta’s request for an injunction.45 
II.  STEPHENSON 
In one sense, it might be said that the Court in Stephenson picked 
up where the decision in Syngenta left off.  The federal judicial authority 
to enjoin state collateral attacks on a prior federal judgment approving a 
class action settlement is one aspect of the post-Syngenta problem of 
defining, generally, the limits of federal injunctive power.  Because a 
majority of justices could not agree in Stephenson, we still do not know 
where the Supreme Court will draw those boundaries.  In the meantime, 
then, we may approach the question left unanswered by Stephenson by 
examining the Second Circuit’s opinion, along with the positions of the 
parties and their amici before the Supreme Court.  First, though, a quick 
summary of the facts of the dispute is in order.46 
A. Factual Prelude: The Agent Orange Litigation 
Two Vietnam War veterans, Joe Isaacson and Daniel Stephenson, 
brought separate actions alleging exposure to Agent Orange during the 
Vietnam War.  Their suits were filed, respectively, in August 1998 and 
February 1999.  These filing dates immediately raise several problems.  
One might well ask, for instance, why veterans who fought during the 
1960s only first brought suit more than a quarter century after their 
wartime exposure.  As provocative as this question might be,47 
 
 45. See Civil Docket Sheet, Price v. Ciba-Geigy, Docket No. 94-cv-00647-CB (injunctive 
relief granted November 20, 2003). 
 46. Those interested in a more complete factual record may consult the appellate court’s 
decision.  See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 47. I do not mean to suggest that plaintiffs lack good arguments to account for why their 
claims are not time-barred.  In this regard, the Second Circuit noted in its decision that Isaacson was 
not diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lympohoma until 1996 and that Stephenson’s doctors first told 
him he had bone marrow cancer in February 1998.  Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255.  Additionally, as 
respondents noted in their brief before the United States Supreme Court: “Under the law of their 
home states, neither Isaacson, a citizen of New Jersey, nor Stephenson, a citizen of Louisiana, could 
have brought a cancer claim against petitioners until he was actually diagnosed with cancer.”  See 
Brief for Respondents at *4, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), 
available at 2003 WL 193581.  See also generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Futures Problem, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1907 (2000) (“[A] futures claimant is one who cannot be specifically 
identified as being causally related to a specific potentially liable actor. Stated in epistemological 
terms, a “futures” therefore is a hypothetical person. A hypothetical person cannot have real legal 
rights or be owed real legal obligations. By the same token, a hypothetical person cannot be the 
subject of a binding determination except through the concept of an in rem proceeding.”).  The main 
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defendants never had to raise this argument because of a second aspect 
of the problem raised by these late filing dates, a problem, we may note, 
that is reminiscent of the procedural problem the Henson plaintiffs faced 
in Syngenta. 
For those who are familiar with the long history of the Agent 
Orange litigation in the United States, the filing of any lawsuit after 
1994 will bring to mind the settlement approved by United States 
District Judge Jack Weinstein purporting to bar recovery for any suits 
filed after December 31, 1994.  As the Second Circuit noted in its 
decision, in 1984 “virtually identical claims against these defendants 
[were] brought by a class of military personnel who were exposed to 
Agent Orange while in Vietnam between 1961 and 1972.”48  The class 
certified by Judge Weinstein in 1984 purported to include, inter alia, any 
persons in the United States Armed Forces “at any time from 1961 to 
1972 who were injured while in or near Vietnam by exposure to Agent 
Orange,” and listed as members, all “spouses, parents and children of the 
veterans born before January 1, 1984” who were “directly or 
derivatively injured as a result of the exposure.”49  Notice was sent 
advising that persons who wished to opt out must do so by May 1, 1984.  
Thereafter, the named plaintiffs, acting on behalf of all persons who had 
not opted out (and Stephenson and Issacson had certainly not opted out), 
reached a settlement of all claims against the manufacturers of Agent 
Orange.  The Agent Orange settlement, which disposed of these 
“virtually identical claims” that Stephenson and Isaacson subsequently 
brought fourteen years later, formed the basis for defendants’ assertion 
that Stephenson’s and Isaacson’s claims were barred. 
B. Of Apples and Second Bites: Comparing Syngenta and Stephenson 
On its face, these facts suggest an analogy between the attempt by 
the Henson plaintiffs to seek additional relief against Syngenta, 
following the global settlement reached in the federal class action 
proceeding in the Price litigation, and the attempt by Stephenson and 
Isaacson to seek recovery against the Agent Orange manufacturers years 
after the global settlement Judge Weinstein approved.  Indeed, if passage 
of time were the only consideration, it would be much harder to justify 
 
point I am making here is that the question of whether these claims were time-barred was never 
reached because defendants relied, instead, on a logically precedent preclusion defense, as discussed 
below. 
 48. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 251. 
 49. Id. at 252. 
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allowing the Stephenson and Isaacson claims to be brought, nearly a 
decade and a half after the Agent Orange settlement, as compared with 
the relatively brief interval that passed between the time the Price 
settlement was concluded and the Henson plaintiffs reasserted their 
claims in Iberville Parish, Louisiana.  These patent similarities mask 
important differences between the cases, however. 
One key difference between the state plaintiffs in Syngenta and the 
Stephenson and Isaacson plaintiffs in Stephenson is that the former were 
parties to the global settlement reached and approved by the federal 
court (recall that they actually intervened into that litigation).  They also 
voluntarily compromised their claims against the chemical company in 
exchange for some monetary payment that they actually received.  Not 
so with Messrs. Stephenson and Isaacson.  Neither had received  any 
portion of the global Agent Orange settlement fund to compensate them 
for their injuries.  And, while defendants argued that Stephenson and 
Isaacson were absent members of the certified class and, therefore, 
bound by that settlement where they did not opt out of the class, whether 
these absent class members were barred by the actions of the named 
plaintiffs was precisely the question on which the Court granted 
certiorari in Stephenson.  That is, from the plaintiffs’ perspective in 
Stephenson, the difference between Henson and the other plaintiffs who 
voluntarily intervened in Syngenta is that Messrs. Stephenson and 
Isaacson did not participate in the 1984 case in Judge Weinstein’s court, 
likely received no notice that there even was a case against the 
manufacturers of Agent Orange, and would probably have not paid 
attention to the notice if they had received it since at the time they had 
not been diagnosed with any illness or condition.50  In other words, 
Stephenson and Isaacson questioned how they could be bound to a 
judgment approving a settlement in which they did not participate and 
from which they were not to receive any share of the proceeds, based 
solely on the determination of the certifying court that they were 
adequately represented by those who did. 
It should be noted that there had been attempts by other plaintiffs, 
after 1984, to bring additional claims against the Agent Orange 
manufacturers.51  All of these earlier cases, however, had been brought 
 
 50. Cf. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (noting that giving 
effective notice is likely not possible to exposure-only class members). 
 51. The most prominent of these cases were the two class actions originally filed in Texas 
state court: Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. and Hartman v. Diamond Shamrock 
Chemicals Co.  These were the cases subsequently removed under the All Writs Act that eventually 
led the Second Circuit to affirm the validity of invoking the All Writs Act to remove a case 
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by plaintiffs who had manifested injury before 1994.  Consequently, all 
earlier claimants had been entitled to at least some share in the Agent 
Orange settlement, a fact that carried considerable significance in the 
Second Circuit’s decision to uphold Judge Weinstein’s adequacy 
determinations as to these plaintiffs.52  By contrast, the Isaacson and 
Stephenson cases, brought by and on behalf of claimants who alleged 
that their injuries manifested after 1994, directly posed the question of 
whether the named class members in Agent Orange had adequately 
represented those members of the class whose injuries did not become 
cognizable until after the settlement fund had been depleted. 
C. Stephenson and Isaacson in the Lower Courts 
1. Judge Weinstein Dismisses both Claims 
Stephenson’s and Isaacson’s argument that they were not parties to 
the earlier proceeding and, therefore, not bound by that judgment fell on 
deaf ears at the district court level.  Judge Weinstein, to whom both 
cases had been transferred,53 dismissed their claims, concluding that the 
prior Agent Orange settlement proscribed them from seeking recovery 
since it barred recovery by any plaintiffs after 1994. 
2. The Second Circuit’s Reversal 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that the prior 
settlement did not preclude Stephenson and Isaacson from asserting 
claims for injuries sustained by their exposure to Agent Orange.  Several 
aspects of its opinion are worth highlighting. 
a. All Writs Act Removal Upheld 
First, the appellate court found that even though there was neither 
diversity between the parties nor a federal question in Isaacson, the case 
 
otherwise not within the district court’s original jurisdiction.  See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d 1425 
(2d. Cir 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
 52. See Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 1435-36; see also Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 n.7 
(noting that the Agent Orange II court’s conclusion that pre-1994 claimants were adequately 
represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation “was based, at least in part, on those claimants’ 
eligibility for compensation from the settlement fund”). 
 53. Isaacson, begun in New Jersey state court, was removed to federal court (on the authority 
of the All Writs Act) and then transferred to Judge Weinstein by the MDL panel under 28 U.S.C. § 
1407.  Stephenson was filed in the Western Distirct of Louisiana and subsequently transferred by 
the MDL panel to Judge Weinstein and consolidated with Isaacson.  See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 
255-56. 
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was properly removed under the All Writs Act because the case raised 
the question of the preclusive effect of the previous Agent Orange 
settlement.  After Syngenta, it is clear that this portion of the appellate 
court’s decision is no longer good law.  It is worth pausing to reflect, 
however, on the absence of any meaningful consideration by the Second 
Circuit of why alternatives to removal were not adequate to determine 
the preclusive effect of Judge Weinstein’s 1984 Agent Orange judgment.  
The Second Circuit did not address why the preclusion question could 
not be handled by the New Jersey state court judge presiding over the 
Isaacson case and/or even by Judge Weinstein himself through 
consideration of whether to enjoin Isaacson from litigating his claims in 
New Jersey.  Instead, the appellate court summarily noted that “the court 
‘best situated to make this determination’ is the court that entered 
judgment.”54 
One explanation, perhaps, for the approach taken by the circuit 
court may be simply that the court thought consideration of these 
alternatives unnecessary, given the availability of removal under the All 
Writs Act.  Yet, given what was said earlier about Rehnquist’s 
unwillingness in Syngenta to explicate the role of preclusion law and/or 
the availability of injunctive relief to deal with threatening state 
litigation, the Second Circuit’s ready resort to All Writs Act removal 
probably also reflects the uncertainty felt among the lower courts (and, 
by extension, litigants) as to the proper mechanisms for protecting prior 
federal judgments or a federal judge’s continuing jurisdiction in a case.  
Additionally, as I will argue in Part III, given the narrow scope of the 
Court’s opinion in Syngenta and the lack of a majority opinion in 
Stephenson, it appears that the uncertainty over the scope of the federal 
judicial injunctive power will continue. 
b. Right to Collateral Attack Upheld 
After allowing removal of the Isaacson case under the All Writs 
Act, the Second Circuit turned to the central question on appeal: namely, 
whether the plaintiffs’ state claims were barred by the prior Agent 
Orange judgment.  The appellate court dissected the question into two 
steps.  The court first considered whether plaintiffs could bring a 
collateral attack against that judgment or whether, as defendants argued, 
such an attack was barred because Judge Weinstein had already 
considered and “extensively litigated” their rights in the prior 
 
 54. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257 (quoting its earlier decision in Agent Orange II, 996 F.2d at 
1431). 
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litigation.55  Assuming a right to collaterally attack the judgment, the 
second step then was to consider whether the named plaintiffs in 1984 
had been adequate representatives of futures plaintiffs. 
The tricky part to the first step of the analysis was that whether 
Stephenson, Isaacson and all other post-1994 unnamed class claimants 
could collaterally attack the 1984 judgment depended on whether they 
were regarded as parties in that prior litigation.  If the named plaintiffs 
were not adequate representatives of the future claimants, then Messrs. 
Stephenson and Isaacson and other similarly situated persons would not 
be bound by Judge Weinstein’s prior judgment.  As the Second Circuit 
succinctly put it: “If plaintiffs were not proper parties to that 
judgment . . . res judicata cannot defeat their claims.”56  In non-class 
litigation, the question of who is a party and, therefore, bound to a 
judgment is usually uncomplicated; typically, all that must be done is to 
consider whether the person (or entity) was properly served or otherwise 
appeared in the case.  The class action context complicates the analysis, 
however: whether one is a “party” plaintiff to a class action proceeding 
turns on whether he or she is adequately represented by the named class 
plaintiffs.  As the Supreme Court famously observed in Hansberry v. 
Lee, in a passage that is worth quoting at length: 
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a 
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has 
not been made a party by service of process . . . . To these general rules 
there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely defined 
by judicial opinion, the judgment in a “class” or “representative” suit, 
to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of 
the class or those represented who were not made parties to it . . . . The 
class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree 
in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the 
litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the 
usual rules of procedure is impracticable . . . . In such cases where the 
interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of 
those who are, and where it is considered that the latter fairly represent 
the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all 
have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.57 
In judging whether the interests of those not joined are of the same 
class as those who are, the Court subsequently ruled in Phillips 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 259. 
 57. 311 U.S. 32, 40-42 (1940). 
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Petroleum v. Shutts58 that “the Due Process Clause of course requires 
that the named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of 
absent class members.”59 
The “at all times” language of Shutts remains a source of debate 
among some commentators60 and was squarely at issue in the 
Stephenson appeal.61  The Second Circuit in Stephenson, however, 
squarely accepted the notion that adequacy is not to be judged 
exclusively by the rendering court but may be questioned collaterally.  In 
particular, the panel opinion noted that plaintiffs could bring a collateral 
attack on the 1984 judgment for two reasons.  Judge Weinstein had 
made no determination about adequacy of representation as to claimants, 
such as these plaintiffs, who manifested injury after 1994.62  Moreover, 
the appellate court noted, citing several lower court opinions (though, 
somewhat curiously, neither Hansberry nor Shutts), whether class 
representatives adequately represent the class can only be determined by 
considering both the validity of the trial court’s determination at the 
certification stage and whether, after the lawsuit is over, the class 
representatives were, in fact, adequate representatives of the interests of 
 
 58. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 59. Id. at 812. 
 60. Compare Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State 
Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 264 
(rejecting the idea that the adequacy determination may be collaterally attacked and arguing that “as 
long as the court entertaining a proposed class action affords class members fair opportunity to raise 
the issue, adequacy of representation should be raised directly, and not be permitted to be raised 
collaterally”) with Monaghan, supra note 11, at 1197 (arguing that “adequate representation, not 
simply adequate procedures, must exist at all times” and critiquing Kahan and Silberman’s 
interpretation of the relevant authorities).  See Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack 
for Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383 (2000).  Richard Nagareda has 
recently entered the debate on the side of those seeking to limit collateral review of class judgments 
by arguing that “commentators have made too much of the reference to the adequacy of class 
representation ‘at all times.’”  Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class 
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 315 (2003) (arguing that “a conception of class representation 
grounded in administrative law—specifically, its structures for accountability and its demand for 
reasoned explanation as a check upon arbitrariness—can generate the desperately needed 
supplement to conventional preclusion analysis for class judgments”). 
 61. Indeed, reflective of the leading work that these legal scholars have undertaken in this 
debate, the briefs of petitioners and respondents (and their respective amici) also divide in their 
treatment of the available academic commentary.  See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners at 28, Dow Chem. 
Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2002 WL 31914663 (citing, inter 
alia, Kahan and Silberman, supra note 60); Brief of Respondents, supra note 47, at 26 (citing, inter 
alia, Woolley, supra note 60). 
 62. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257-58 (observing that “neither this Court nor the district court 
has addressed specifically the adequacy of representation for those members of the class whose 
injuries manifested after depletion of the settlement funds”). 
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the class.63  This conclusion, the Second Circuit also noted, was 
consistent with the maxim that “a court adjudicating a dispute cannot 
predetermine the res judicata effect of its own judgment.”64 
c. Named Plaintiffs in 1984 were Inadequate Representatives 
of Futures Plaintiffs 
Having disposed of the first line of defense offered by defendants—
that plaintiffs had no right to collaterally attack the prior judgment—the 
appellate court then reached the second step which, specifically, required 
an evaluation of whether the named class members in 1984 were 
adequate representatives of post-1994 claimants such as Stephenson and 
Isaacson. 
The Second Circuit found the named class members not to have 
been adequate representatives of the post-1994 claimants.  The principal 
basis for the court’s conclusion that the named plaintiffs were not 
adequate representatives was the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.65  The Second Circuit 
reasoned that although Messrs. Stephenson and Isaacson both fell within 
the class definition in the Agent Orange litigation—both served in the 
United States military in Vietnam between 1961 and 1972 and allege to 
have been exposed to Agent Orange while on their tour of duty there—
there was an inherent conflict between their interests (as futures 
plaintiffs) and those of the named class members who sought immediate 
recompense for their present injuries.66  As a result of this inherent 
conflict, Stephenson and Isaacson could not have been adequately 
represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation under Amchem. 
 
 63. Id. at 258-59 (citing Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973)).  One possible 
explanation for the Second Circuit’s decision to cite neither Hansberry nor Shutts is that, strictly 
speaking, both decisions only addressed the due process limits under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Illinois and Kansas courts, respectively.  The question before the 
Second Circuit in Stephenson concerned the preclusive effect of a federal judgment, namely the 
federal judgment by Weinstein approving the Agent Orange class certification and settlement in 
1984, as limited by the Fifth Amendment.  Compare Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 69 (noting that “[t]he 
question in this appeal is whether plaintiff-appellant Gonzales and the class he seeks to represent are 
bound by the res judicata effect of a prior class suit”).  That prior class suit was brought in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 
 64. Id. at 258 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985)). 
 65. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 66. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/1
HOFFMAN3.DOC 5/14/2004  10:29 AM 
2004] FEDERAL JUDICIAL INJUNCTIVE POWER 627 
D. Before the United States Supreme Court 
1. Petitioners Emphasized Policy Consequences of Allowing 
Collateral Attacks 
Before the United States Supreme Court, petitioners focused their 
arguments for reversing the Second Circuit on the policy implications of 
a rule permitting collateral attacks.  They argued that in allowing the 
plaintiffs’ state suits to proceed the Second Circuit approved a broad 
collateral attack rule that threatened the finality of all class action 
determinations.  The result sanctioned by the appellate court, they 
argued, would disrupt class actions in the future and, potentially, even 
those previously settled.67  The specter petitioners painted was of absent 
class members rising up en masse to announce their dissatisfaction with 
class action settlements, without any time constraint as to when such 
attacks could be brought.  Nor, they noted, would there be any limit to 
the number of attacks that could be brought: even if one attack is 
successfully resisted, nothing in the Second Circuit’s broad rule would 
preclude another nonparticipating class member from asserting another 
challenge, in a different forum.68  All of these policy considerations, 
petitioners and their amici urged, would “seriously interfere with 
litigants’ incentives to settle class action disputes.”69  As one amicus 
brief for petitioners put it: 
Why would any rational defendant agree to settle if it cannot achieve 
peace and repose with respect to the entire class?  At the very least, the 
risk that a class settlement might be disturbed, years later, by a now-
silent class member will substantially discourage defendants from 
entering into any class settlement.70 
As a secondary position, petitioners and their amici argued that if 
the Court were to allow some form of collateral attack, it should limit its 
scope.  According to petitioners, the second court could retain a 
collateral review role without having the broad, de novo review 
contemplated by the Second Circuit.  Where the Second Circuit regarded 
collateral review as appropriately allowing a second court to determine 
whether conditions exist that justify granting finality to the first 
 
 67. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 61, at 39-40. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Brief of the Products Liability Advisory Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 11, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 
2002 WL 31886886 [hereinafter Brief of amicus curiae PLAC]. 
 70. Id. 
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judgment, petitioners and their amici argued that any collateral review 
allowed should be limited so that the second court would only review the 
adequacy of the procedures taken by the certifying court.  Under this 
view, so long as the certifying court “ensure[s] that class counsel 
diligently represents the class, and that the representative’s interests do 
not substantially conflict with those of other class members,” there 
would be no grounds for collaterally attacking the adequacy 
determination.71  Undergirding their position was an assumption, of 
course, that a federal court’s obligation to oversee the procedures in 
certifying a class under Rule 23 is sufficiently protective of the interests 
of absent class members so as to justify according finality to its 
judgment when the court properly carries out its obligations.72 
Most broadly, petitioners and their amici argued that while 
according the right to collateral attack may be a worthwhile goal in the 
abstract, a larger and more pressing value is the social interest in 
resolving complex litigation.  The broad collateral attack right 
authorized by the Second Circuit would be inconsistent with res judicata 
principles, petitioners argued, as they pertain to finality of judgments.  
As a result, the social interest in resolving complex litigation would be 
stymied.  Instead, according to petitioners and their amici, finality 
should be given to the certifying court so long as class members received 
adequate notice and the court provided a full and fair opportunity for 
class members to raise objections to the adequacy of representation by 
the class representatives.73 
2. Respondents Focused on Specific Facts of the Two Cases 
In their brief and in oral argument before the high court, 
respondents emphasized most centrally the specific facts of the 
Stephenson and Isaacson cases.74  This strategy was clearly driven by a 
belief that the specific facts of the two cases were egregious enough that 
the Court would be likely to permit these collateral attacks, even if there 
was unwillingness to approve a broader right to maintain collateral 
attacks in other cases.  Of course, respondents also urged the Court to 
affirm the Second Circuit’s decision insofar as it recognized a broad 
 
 71. Id. at 23. 
 72. See id. at 25 (asserting that “[a] broad collateral attack rule is not necessary to provide 
adequate protection for absent class members interests”). 
 73. See id. at 12 (arguing that the “certifying court’s adequacy of representation determination 
should be final and conclusive as to all class members” assuming notice and a full and fair 
opportunity to raise objections is given). 
 74. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 47, at 1. 
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right of collateral attack where named class representatives were 
inadequate representatives,75 but their written brief contains an unusually 
large portion of the allotted pages devoted to highlighting the specific 
factual background involved in the Stephenson and Isaacson suits and 
why these facts warranted allowing these particular plaintiffs to proceed 
with their claims.76 
3. Amici for Respondent Focused on Broader Policy Implications 
While respondents tethered most of their arguments to the facts of 
the two cases, amici for respondents argued more broadly for the Court 
to affirm the Second Circuit’s decision allowing collateral attacks.  
Arguments made by several amici focused more heavily on the practical 
realities of class litigation where collateral attacks are a rare but 
important deterrent to collusive conduct in the class action arena.  
Several briefs noted that the availability of collateral review better 
ensures the nonparticipating class members are treated fairly.77 
Furthermore, other amici argued that in questioning the right to 
bring a collateral attack it was petitioners who were seeking to unsettle 
established law.78  The traditional and well-established rule, they 
observed, is that persons who do not participate in a legal proceeding 
may challenge through collateral attack in a subsequent proceeding the 
power of the initial court to bind it to judgment.  This traditional rule is 
based on principles of due process the Court had recognized for well 
over a century.  Several briefs noted, for instance, that the Court had 
ruled on numerous occasions—including seminal decisions like 
Pennoyer v. Neff and Hansberry v. Lee—that one is not bound to a 
 
 75. The argument portion of their brief followed the basic two-step structure employed by the 
Second Circuit, arguing, first, that nonparticipating class members may always raise due process 
objections in actions brought subsequent to the judgment of the certifying court; and, secondly, that 
they received neither adequate notice nor representation in the 1984 Agent Orange settlement.  It 
was on the latter point, however, that respondents focused the majority of their written argument. 
 76. Also, it would be incorrect to say that respondents gave no attention to broader policy 
considerations in the case.  For instance, respondents concluded their brief by reminding the Court 
that the philosophical debate between respecting an individual litigant’s right to adjudicate their 
claims and the systemic need for finality has been addressed in the class action context by the Court 
on several prior occasions and that on each occasion the Court has recognized that however 
compelling “finality” may be, necessary exceptions must be carved out and protected.  See Brief of 
Respondents, supra note 47, at 43. 
 77. See, e.g., Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen at 16, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 
U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2003 WL 193571 (arguing that  “collateral review is 
necessary to prevent the abuse of class members’ rights”). 
 78. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors at 1, 6-7, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 
U.S. 111 (2003) (No. 02-271), available at 2003 WL 193562. 
25
Hoffman: Federal Judicial Injunctive Power
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
HOFFMAN3.DOC 5/14/2004  10:29 AM 
630 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:605 
judgment unless they have either been properly served with process or 
have consented to suit in the forum.79  Thus, under the traditional rule, 
persons not formally made parties to a proceeding are not bound by it.80  
Yet, these amici argued, whether absent class members are parties to a 
class proceeding depends on whether the named class plaintiffs are 
adequate representatives of their interests and whether named 
representatives are in fact adequate representatives can only be ensured 
if de novo collateral reviews are allowed.  By contrast, petitioners’ rule 
assumes that absent class members are justified in relying on the 
certifying court and on defendants to ensure that their interests are 
protected.  As a practical matter, however, this is unlikely to occur.  
Neither the presence of objectors, nor the named defendants can cure 
defects of inadequate class representatives, respondents’ amici argued.81 
Additionally and relatedly, amici for respondents parried 
petitioners’ assertion that affirming the Second Circuit would create 
disincentives to settling class litigation and would be disruptive of class 
action procedure by noting that class actions are routinely brought and 
settled today, even as a right to collateral attack is broadly recognized.82 
Furthermore, the policy costs of disallowing collateral attack favor 
rejecting petitioners’ position, amici for respondents argued.  If 
petitioners’ position were adopted, they argued that absent class 
members would have to monitor every class action filed and decide 
whether the amount they have at stake justifies intervention.83  Since 
most of the time individual class members will have only a very small 
personal stake in the litigation, the occasions which will warrant 
intervention into the case will be infrequent.  Additionally, disallowing 
de novo collateral review of the certifying court’s adequacy 
determination would create incentives for collusion between counsel for 
the named plaintiffs and defendants.84 
Finally, several amici concluded by reminding the Court that while 
petitioners tried to suggest that the need for finality is what prompted the 
rule makers to allow for class procedures that will bind nonparticipating 
 
 79. See id. at 8; see also Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen, supra note 77, at 13-14. 
 80. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 8. 
 81. Id. at 14-15. 
 82. Id. at 16.  Even in the Ninth Circuit, where Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 
1999) (Epstein III), is regarded as the lone circuit court decision restricting collateral attacks on a 
certifying court’s judgment, subsequent cases call into question the Epstein III court’s view of 
collateral attack.  See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 914 (2001). For more on Epstein III, see infra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
 83. See Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 16. 
 84. See Brief of amicus curiae Public Citizen, supra note 77, at 18. 
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and unnamed class members, Rule 23 does not demand that the principle 
of finality be accepted, unconditionally, as the paramount goal.  Where 
due process rights have been abridged, they urged, finality must yield. 
III.  IN THE AFTERMATH 
In the aftermath of the decision in Syngenta and the non-decision in 
Stephenson, there are a number of questions that remain to be addressed 
concerning the scope of the federal judicial injunctive power. 
A. Looking Beyond Stephenson 
In the class action arena, the four-four split in Stephenson leaves the 
question on which the Court granted certiorari ripe for reconsideration.  
The Court previously skirted the collateral attack issue in Matsushita 
Electrical Industries Co. v. Epstein.85  While some commentators regard 
the Court’s decision in Matsushita as implicitly restrictive of the right to 
collaterally attack the certifying court’s adequacy determination,86 most 
seem to recognize the Court did not address the point.87  While the non-
decision in Stephenson lacks precedential value, the case advances the 
debate beyond Matsushita: that a plurality of justices were apparently 
 
 85. 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
[R]espondents contend that the settlement proceedings did not satisfy due process 
because the class was inadequately represented. Respondents make this claim in spite of 
the Chancery Court’s express ruling, following argument on the issue, that the class 
representatives fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class.  We need not 
address the due process claim, however, because it is outside the scope of the question 
presented in this Court. 
Id. at 379 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 86. Two of the leading expositors of this view are Professors Silberman and Kahan, who 
argue that  “the Supreme Court’s rejection of an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Statute for 
the federal claims at issue ‘must be read, at least in part, as a rejection of the Epstein plaintiffs’ 
argument . . . that because class counsel could not litigate the exclusive federal claims, they could 
not adequately represent the class for the purposes of settling those claims.” See Marcel Kahan & 
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. 
MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 790 (1998).  See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Full Faith and Credit 
to Settlements in Overlapping Class Actions: A Reply to Professors Kahan and Silberman, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (1998). 
 87. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an 
Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1051 (2003) (“The Supreme Court’s affirmance of claim 
preclusion following the steps taken by the trial judge may be taken as an endorsement of strong 
judicial management in the class context, but it should not be read as approving the principle that a 
hearing by the class judge on the issue of adequacy forecloses challenges in F2.”); Woolley, supra 
note 60, at 416-18 and esp. n.137.  Even Richard Nagareda, an opponent of collateral challenges to 
adequacy, recognizes that in Matsushita “the Court itself explicitly declined to address the adequate 
representation issue on the ground that it lay outside the question presented on appeal.”  Nagareda, 
supra note 60, at 344. 
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willing to reverse the Second Circuit, even on the extreme facts on this 
particular case, suggests that it would be a mistake in the aftermath of 
Stephenson to ignore the very real possibility that the right to collateral 
attack may itself be under attack. 
I certainly do not mean to overstate the point.  The traditional rule 
recognizing the right of absent class members to collaterally attack the 
judgment of the certifying court on due process grounds is accepted, 
virtually without dissent88 among courts and commentators.89  
Nonetheless, one suspects that the willingness of four justices in 
Stephenson to reverse the Second Circuit is likely to encourage 
arguments similar to those advanced by petitioners in the case, for either 
no review or only a minimal level of review.  The Ninth Circuit’s panel 
decision in Epstein III, which is regarded—perhaps dubiously90—as 
restricting an absent class member’s right to collaterally attack a 
certifying court’s adequacy determination, is likely to be a more closely 
considered precedent in future class action litigation as it is invoked by 
those seeking to narrow the scope of collateral review of class 
judgments.  No doubt the continued expansion of class action dockets in 
state and federal court will provide plenty of opportunities for 
reconsideration of the collateral review question. 
Consider one prominent, recent example.  In 2002, a federal district 
judge in Indianapolis certified a nationwide class covering multiple 
 
 88. The leading judicial dissent is the second panel opinion in Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 
641 (9th Cir. 1999).  Several prominent academic commentators have similarly argued against a de 
novo collateral attack rule.  See Kahan & Silberman, supra note 86; Linda Silberman, The 
Vicissitudes of the American Class Action – With A Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
201 (1999).   
 89. See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 
4455, at 484-87 (2002).  Traditional acceptance of the right to collateral attack was not only 
recognized by respondents and their amici in Stephenson, it was also even acknowledged, at least in 
part, by one amicus brief for petitioners.  See Brief of amicus curiae PLAC, supra note 69, at 18 
n.13 (conceding that “application of the ‘jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction’ concept ordinarily 
presupposes the actual presence of the party to be bound in the initial proceeding–an element 
obviously lacking when applied to absent class members who make no appearance before the 
certifying court” (citation omitted)). 
 90. In its initial opinion, the panel ruled 2-1, per Judges Norris and Wiggins, that plaintiffs 
were inadequately represented in the original class proceeding and could collaterally attack the 
judgment on that basis.  Judge O’Scannlain dissented.  After Norris retired (days later), defendants 
filed a motion for rehearing and, on rehearing, the new panel ruled, again, 2-1, that no collateral 
attack could be brought.  The new opinion was written by Judge O’Scannlain and he was joined by 
Judge Wiggins, who did an about face.  Judge Thomas, who replaced Norris, dissented.  Thus, the 
Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Stephenson notes, “putting aside Judge Wiggins’ two votes as 
cancelling themselves out, one judge, Judge O’Scannlain, voted for the no collateral attack of 
adequacy rule, and two judges of the Ninth Circuit voted against it.”  See Law Professors’ Brief, 
supra note 78, at 6 n.6. 
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models of Ford vehicles and Firestone tires sold between 1990 and 2001.  
The class was made up of owners of more than 60 million tires and three 
million cars.91  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district 
court had abused its discretion in certifying a nationwide class, finding, 
inter alia, that too many different state laws would have to be applied in 
the case.92  Unhappy with the decision by the intermediate court of 
appeals, the same lawyers filed new suits in a number of different state 
courts, seeking nationwide class certification in at least five of these 
cases.  Ford and Firestone then returned to the federal district judge in 
Indianapolis and asked her to enforce the Seventh Circuit’s ruling by 
enjoining the plaintiffs and their counsel from filing any other class 
actions.  Notably, the relief Ford and Firestone sought was an order 
foreclosing the filing of any further class litigation in state court, 
including even any attempt at statewide class certification.  The district 
judge denied the motion and the defendants again appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit.93 
This is where the story takes an interesting twist.  On the second 
go-round, the Seventh Circuit ruled partially in favor of plaintiffs and 
partially in favor of the defendants.  Judge Easterbrook first concluded 
that plaintiffs and their counsel were free to attempt to certify plaintiff 
classes on a statewide basis, as the Seventh Circuit’s earlier opinion 
spoke only to the impropriety of certifying a nationwide class.94  The 
panel ultimately held, however, that Ford and Firestone were entitled to 
an injunction precluding all members of the putative national class and 
their lawyers from seeking nationwide class certification in any other 
state court.95  While recognizing that “[n]ormally” the preclusive effect 
of a judgment is to be determined by a second court, not by the court 
rendering the judgment, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that 
exceptional circumstances may warrant the issuance of injunctive relief 
to prevent multiple state courts from opining on the preclusive effect of 
the appellate court’s earlier opinion reversing the district judge’s 
nationwide certification order.  Describing the efforts of plaintiffs and 
 
 91. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 92. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003). 
 93. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) 
[Bridgestone/Firestone II]. 
 94. Id. at 766, 769. 
 95. Id. at 769 (ruling that the district judge must enforce its earlier judgment “by issuing an 
injunction that prevents all members of the putative national classes, and their lawyers, from again 
attempting to have nationwide classes certified over defendants’ opposition with respect to the same 
claims”). 
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their counsel as fomenting redundant litigation, Judge Easterbrook 
observed that “when federal litigation is followed by many duplicative 
state suits, it is sensible to handle the preclusive issue once and for all in 
the original case, rather than put the parties and state judges through an 
unproductive exercise.”96 
Had he stopped there, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion would be 
entirely defensible and sound.  That duplicative or vexatious litigation 
may readily warrant federal injunctive relief rather than reliance on the 
state courts to dismiss each and every new suit commenced is a well 
recognized and unremarkable proposition.  In Wood v. Santa Barbara 
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.,97 for instance, a photographer had initiated 
an action ten years earlier, alleging misappropriation of photographs he 
had taken.  After several of his earlier actions were consolidated, the 
plaintiff commenced a new action in the Federal District Court of 
Nevada against 253 defendants.  While that case was pending, however, 
the plaintiff brought 35 additional, separate actions in 30 different 
jurisdictions.  The district court then dismissed all claims against all 
defendants and entered a permanent injunction against the plaintiff from 
filing similar litigation.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the issuance of the 
permanent injunction, finding that the district court possessed authority 
under the All Writs Act to issue “an injunction against repetitive 
litigation.”98  The court of appeals observed that the plaintiff “has shown 
his intention continually to relitigate claims that have been previously 
dismissed.”99  Following reasoning similar to that employed by Judge 
Easterbrook in Bridgestone/Firestone II, the Ninth Circuit in Wood 
recognized the many advantages to the judicial system of employing 
injunctive relief to thwart a vexatious litigant: 
One advantage of dispensing injunctive relief against relitigation is that 
it is an easy way to articulate forcefully the principles of collateral 
estoppel and res judicata.  For the judicial system, this means a 
preservation of judicial resources.  By describing the principles of 
collateral estoppel in mandatory terms and by reinforcing those 
principles with the threat of holding a vexatious litigant in contempt of 
court, a district judge may deter the filing of frivolous and repetitive 
lawsuits.100 
The difficulty with Bridgestone/Firestone II, however, is that in 
 
 96. Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d at 766. 
 97. 705 F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 98. Id. at 1524. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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approving the issuance of an injunction against any effort to certify a 
nationwide class in any other state court, the opinion sweeps with an 
extremely broad brush.  Thus, instead of saying only that injunctive 
relief was necessary to thwart vexatious litigants from continued refiling 
until they find some state court that would certify a nationwide class, 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion goes on to observe that absent class 
members will always be bound by the actions of the named 
representatives and their lawyers, provided that the non-participants 
were adequately represented in the contest.101  Yet, on what basis does 
Judge Easterbrook conclude that the named plaintiffs in the federal 
Bridgestone/Firestone litigation before Judge Barker adequately 
represented those who did not participate in the case?  The court’s 
conclusion, for which no supporting authorities were cited, rests solely 
on the observation that the district court judge had found that “both the 
named plaintiffs and their lawyers furnished adequate representation to 
the other members of the putative classes” and that her decision “was not 
challenged on the first appeal and is not contested now.”102 
In concluding that the absent class members were adequately 
represented in the federal litigation merely because that is what the 
district judge found and because that finding was not challenged on 
direct appeal, Easterbrook’s opinion seems to track the petitioners’ 
position in Stephenson—whether intentionally or otherwise—that 
collateral challenges to a district court’s judgment on due process 
grounds need not be permitted.  It is enough, under this view, for a 
district court judge to decide the question of adequacy in the first 
instance and then to require any persons disagreeing with that decision 
to lodge their disagreement before the same court that rendered the 
adequacy determination, or on direct appeal. 
Now, perhaps it is appropriate to limit the scope of Easterbrook’s 
sweeping opinion by recognizing what it does not say: namely, that the 
reason no collateral challenges to adequacy were brought by the absent 
class members is that these plaintiffs were represented by the same 
lawyers who represented the named class representatives in the federal 
litigation.  Consequently, they (or at least their lawyers) had no incentive 
to and did not lodge any due process adequacy objections in the 
subsequent state cases.  While it may be sensible to enjoin these absent 
class members and their counsel from relitigating the very same issue 
that the named class representatives argued and lost in the Seventh 
 
 101. Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d at 769. 
 102. Id. 
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Circuit, it is unfortunate that Bridestone/Firestone II may be read as 
broadly proscribing any collateral challenges on due process grounds to 
the certifying court’s adequacy determination. 
As litigants continue to parry over the scope of collateral review, 
the battles will be waged against a rich backdrop of contemporary debate 
over class action policy and procedure.  That debate, broadly stated, pits 
an individual litigant’s right to sue against the systemic value of finality 
and resolution.  The debate is certainly not new,103 but recent legislative 
and judicial developments—of which Stephenson is one illustration—
reflect renewed interest in the balance between these competing 
principles. 
In recent years, a number of state legislatures have enacted class 
action reform;104 the federal Congress has been working toward 
compromise on the Class Action Fairness Act (which, as of this writing, 
has passed in the House but supporters have not yet been able to bring it 
to a full vote in the Senate);105 in September 2003, the U.S. Judicial 
Conference approved changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; 
and, of course, the United States Supreme Court has weighed in several 
times in the last few years, most notably in Amchem and Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.,106  on some of the essential problems with 
representative litigation.  These developments do not all point in one 
direction but, collectively, they implicate the same thematic struggle 
witnessed in Stephenson over competing judicial priorities: an individual 
litigant’s right to sue balanced against collective resolution and finality; 
fairness against efficiency; and “principle” versus “pragmatism,” to 
reference Francis McGovern’s characterization.107  At least for the 
 
 103. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 203 (1950) (“However 
convenient class suits may be, it is obvious that they do not comply with some well-recognized 
general principles of law. The incongruity which startles us today is the disregard of the requirement 
that a man ought to have his day in court—his rights and duties should not be adjudicated in his 
absence.”). 
 104. For instance, effective September 1, 2003, the Texas legislature enacted reforms to class 
action procedure under state law which, inter alia, place more stringent limits on obtaining class 
certification under Texas law.  All of the reforms were prompted by concerns over the perceived 
abuses in class litigation.  See generally Alistair Dawson, House Bill 4 and the Future of Class 
Action Litigation, 24 THE ADVOCATE (Fall 2003), at 60. 
 105. The Class Action Fairness Act passed the House as H.R. 1115 and is still pending in the 
Senate as S. 1751.  The last attempt, on October 22, 2003, to bring the bill before the Senate 
narrowly fell short.  See Class Actions Motion to Bring Class Action Bill to Senate Floor Fails by 
One Vote, 72 U.S.L.W. 2233 (Oct. 28, 2003). 
 106. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 107. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for State and Federal Judges in 
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1870 (2000) (citing Amchem, Ortiz and other 
judicial decisions and arguing that they reflect that “certain fundamental principles of our system of 
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foreseeable future, the arguments of proponents and opponents of 
collateral review will be played out against this dynamic judicial and 
legislative canvas.  As the political climate changes over class action 
policy generally, it will undoubtedly also influence the shape of the 
debate over the right to collaterally attack a certifying court’s judgment. 
Whatever consequences Stephenson may hold for representative 
litigation, the case may well carry even more significant implications 
outside of the class context.  As an empirical matter, we know that 
litigants rarely bring due process collateral attacks on a certifying court’s 
adequacy determination.108  Patrick Woolley reports that on only forty-
four occasions in the last thirty years have absent class members 
collaterally attacked a judgment based on inadequate representation.109  
While collateral attacks in the class context are an infinitesimal 
percentage of state and federal dockets, collateral attacks are far more 
frequently brought by absent defendants challenging the jurisdictional 
authority of a court to enter binding judgment against them.  David 
Shapiro and his co-authors of the amicus brief in support of respondents 
in Stephenson argued that if adequacy of representation is the theoretical 
basis for binding absent class members to a judgment brought by others 
on their behalf, minimum contacts is the theoretically equivalent basis 
for justifying a court’s jurisdiction over any absent defendant.110  Any 
restriction, then, on the right to collaterally attack the certifying court’s 
adequacy determination would also invite restrictions on the right to 
collaterally attack other bases for binding absent parties to judgment, 
they argued.  Consider the likely consequences, the Law Professors’ 
Brief urged the Court, of adopting petitioners’ argument that the 
certifying court alone would determine adequacy: 
Is this Court then prepared to rule, as it almost certainly would be 
asked to do, that a procedure for determining minimum contacts (when 
the defendant is absent) should end all later inquiry into that 
jurisdictional question?  With respect to petitioners’ fall-back position– 
that the second court should not review adequacy de novo–would not 
the logical next step be that, to the extent a second court can still 
review a first court’s finding of minimum contacts, that review must 
not proceed de novo?111 
Having framed the issue in the Stephenson case as fundamentally 
 
litigation have triumphed over pragmatism”). 
 108. Woolley, supra note 60, at 443. 
 109. Id. at n.268. 
 110. Brief of amicus curiae Law Professors, supra note 78, at 17. 
 111. Id. at 17-18. 
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jurisdictional in nature, the Law Professors’ Brief concluded that the 
argument for retaining the traditional rule allowing collateral attacks is 
compelling: 
Adequacy of representation is the bedrock guarantee provided all 
absent class members in every form of class action in every court, 
federal and state . . . . But once one accepts that adequacy is the 
lynchpin of the constitutional exercise of jurisdiction–a reading 
consistent with all the provisions of Rule 23 as well at that rule’s 
historical foundations and the arguments made at the time it was 
adopted, the adoption of any one of Petitioner’s positions might well 
amount to an unintended earthquake in procedural law.112 
If Shapiro and his co-authors are right, then the shock waves from a 
restriction on de novo collateral review in the class action context could 
reverberate throughout the judicial system.  It is this kind of “unintended 
earthquake” that should encourage lawyers—on both sides of the bar—
to take the non-decision in Stephenson very seriously indeed. 
B. Looking Beyond Syngenta 
We have spoken, thus far, of the possible legal implications from 
the debate over collateral review in Stephenson and suggested that the 
willingness of four justices to reverse the Second Circuit may encourage 
reconsideration of heretofore settled rules of law both in and out of the 
class action context.  It should be clear, though, that what is not ripe for 
reconsideration, in any context, is the argument the Court resoundingly 
rejected in Syngenta for invoking the residual power embodied  in the 
All Writs Act to remove a state case not within the federal district 
court’s original jurisdiction.  But if Syngenta closed the door to that 
procedural mechanism for protecting a federal court’s judgment or its 
ongoing jurisdiction, it left unresolved several much harder issues.  Most 
centrally, the Chief Justice’s passing recitation in Syngenta that a prior 
federal judgment may be enforced either by an anti-suit injunction or 
through assertion of a preclusion defense in the state court, raises several 
key questions.  On what occasions is a federal court authorized to enjoin 
litigants from pursuing a parallel or subsequent state suit?  Does the 
scope of this authority depend on whether it is sought before113 or 
 
 112. Id. at 19-20. 
 113. Cf. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 
145 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a request to enjoin parallel state 
litigation, noting that “[t]here is no classwide settlement pending before the district court (indeed, 
the conditional class certification by the district court no longer subsists) and no stipulation of 
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after114 the federal court enters judgment following the jury’s verdict or 
pursuant to a class settlement?  If so, in what respects?  Even if an 
injunction is authorized—either before or after judgment—on what 
occasions should a federal court stay its hand and not interfere with the 
state proceedings?  This latter question, in turn, raises a corollary set of 
inquires concerning the competence by state courts to enforce federal 
rights and obligations, a subject that also bears relevance in the 
application of recognized federal common law abstention doctrines. 
These questions are not easily answered.  As a general proposition, 
parallel proceedings (whether they be in different state courts or in 
federal and state court) addressing the same in personam cause of action 
are permissible in our federal system.  As the Third Circuit observed in 
Carlough v. Amchem Products, Inc.,115 “simultaneous federal and state 
adjudications of the same in personam cause of action do not of 
themselves trigger the necessary in aid exception [of the Anti-Injunction 
Act], and the letter and spirit of the Anti-Injunction Act and All-Writs 
Act counsel a restrictive application of that exception.”116   
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers,117 the Supreme Court emphasized the key role that federalism 
principles play in the presumption for deference: 
 
settlement or prospect of settlement in that court is imminent.”  Id. 
 114. Where settlement of the class litigation has been approved by the court under Rule 23(e), 
use of the injunctive power has been approved to enjoin absent class members from bringing 
subsequent state actions.  See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. 
Tex 1978), aff’d 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth Circuit upheld injunction proscribing the 
filing of state court suits issued by district court after its certification of the consolidated lawsuits as 
a mandatory class action, reasoning that the “in aid of its jurisdiction” and “to protect and effectuate 
its judgments” exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act applied where the district court had already 
approved settlement, as to most defendants, at the time the injunction issued).  Injunctions have 
even issued where a settlement was close but not yet finalized.  See, e.g., In re Baldwin-United 
Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1985) (injunction upheld where imminent settlement was 
regarded as “the virtual equivalent of a res” under the “in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to § 2283 
and where it was found that “the potential for an onslaught of state actions threatened to seriously 
impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to approve settlements in the multi-district 
litigation”); In re Asbestos School Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 WL 61156, at *2 (E.D. Pa. April 16, 
1991) , aff’d mem. 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991) (observing that “this court’s ability to oversee a 
possible settlement would be seriously impaired by a continuing litigation of parallel actions”); 
Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (anti-suit injunction approved, citing 
Asbestos School Litigation and Baldwin-United, where class action settlement was “imminent”).  
For additional authorities and an excellent, comprehensive description of the case law, see Georgene 
M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction, et al, 
ALI-ABA, CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, available at SHO63 
ALI-ABA, pt. 3-4, at 221, 350-66 (Jan. 2003). 
 115. 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 116. Id. at 202. 
 117. 398 U.S. 281 (1970). 
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Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state 
court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state 
courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the 
controversy.  The explicit wording of [§] 2283 itself implies as much, 
and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads 
inevitably to that conclusion.118 
Yet, even with a presumption in favor of deference based on “the 
fundamental principle of a dual system of courts,” friction between 
coordinate judiciaries is inevitable and the costs of such friction will 
often be too substantial to ignore.  The Anti-Injunction Act, with its 
narrow but vital exceptions, simultaneously recognizes the virtue of 
reducing jurisdictional conflicts between coordinate courts as well as the 
need for preempting threats to the integrity of a state court’s 
judgment.119  The effort to accommodate these competing values in a 
single statute has proved a nettlesome problem, however.  Then-
Professor Diane Wood once observed, drawing on David Currie’s earlier 
work, that the Anti-Injunction Act “is badly in need of attention . . . . 
The Act still suffers from ‘dense clouds of ambiguity,’ and still might 
fairly be called the ‘most obscure of jurisdictional statutes.’”120 As a 
result of all of this ambiguity and the inherent tensions at play in the 
statute, it is not always clear when a federal injunction may issue, even if 
it is abundantly clear from experience there will be occasions that 
warrant the enjoining of concurrent or subsequent state proceedings. 
One reflection of this uncertainty in the law is the effort by the 
Board of Editors of the Manual for Complex Litigation to summarize the 
relevant doctrinal rules.  Thus, the current Draft Copy of the Fourth 
Edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation begins the section on 
Jurisdictional Conflicts with this advice: “An injunction against pending 
state proceedings, even if authorized by federal statutes and case law can 
have a detrimental effect on future efforts to work cooperatively and 
should be used only as a last resort, if at all.”121  The Manual then notes 
that exceptional circumstances may justify departure from the general 
presumption, and proceeds to list some occasions when enjoining 
litigants from prosecuting concurrent state actions may be warranted. 
 
 118. Id. at 297. 
 119. See generally, Hoffman, supra note 13, at 459-61. 
 120. Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 320 (quoting David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the 
American Law Institute, pt. 2, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 322 (1969)). 
 121. Draft Copy, Manual for Complex Litigation § 20.32 at 237 (4th ed. 2003) [hereafter 
MANUAL]. 
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For instance the Manual notes that the Anti-Injunction Act and All 
Writs Act have been used to enjoin state litigation “that would require 
relitigation in state court of a matter finally decided in federal court” or 
to “stay orders that would otherwise prevent a federal court from 
proceeding with pretrial aspects of the litigation.”122  These observations 
are empirically correct, of course, but necessarily incomplete.  Even if 
the relitigation exception to § 2283 would allow an injunction to issue 
when the matter previously has been decided, why does deference to the 
state court not counsel discretion against interference absent a showing 
that the state judge is incapable or unwilling to properly apply preclusion 
law to protect the federal judgment?  As noted above, the Chief Justice’s 
opinion in Syngenta certainly leaves this question unresolved.123 
Another occasion the Manual references which may warrant the 
issuance of a federal judicial injunction to stay state proceedings is 
“where a class has been certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3), and where class members have failed to avail themselves of 
their right to opt out and litigate their claims independently in state or 
federal court.”124  No exception is listed or cross reference made, 
however, to occasions where the absent class members’ subsequent state 
suit also involves a collateral attack on the adequacy determination in 
the judgment of the certifying court; in other words, the question 
implicated by the ambiguous outcome in Stephenson.  On still other 
points, the Manual is not up to date with current law,125 a problem the 
authors concede is inevitable with the project and one about which they 
wisely remind lawyers to be cautious.126 
My point is not to identify shortcomings of the Manual.  It is a 
masterful work of enormous value to the bench and bar.  Instead, the 
critique goes to the difficulties inherent in marking the boundaries 
between deference to state courts and the unavoidable need for some 
authority to stay litigation that threatens a court’s continuing jurisdiction 
or prior judgment.  The challenge of identifying these boundaries—of 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36. 
 124. MANUAL, supra note 121, § 20.32 at 239. 
 125. See, e.g., id. (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act and All Writs Act have been used “to 
effectuate global settlements in large scale litigation by enjoining or removing to federal court 
parallel state court litigation that would otherwise frustrate the adoption or implementation of 
comprehensive class settlements approved by the federal court as binding on the parties to the state 
court litigation” but failing to cite the Court’s recent decision in Syngenta as foreclosing the removal 
option). 
 126. See id. at 2 (“[I]t should go without saying that changes in statutes, case law, regulations, 
and technology will quickly date some specific references in the Manual and users need to exercise 
standard research practices.”). 
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finding the right balance—has not escaped the Supreme Court.  In this 
regard, I have said that the problem of Syngenta is that while the Court 
rejected a residual authority permitting removal of state cases to protect 
federal judgments and jurisdiction, it gave no guidance to order the 
choice of alternatives.  Of course, Syngenta was certainly not the first 
time the Court has failed to clarify the ordering of options for protecting 
federal judgments. 
Rivet v. Regions Bank127 concerned the power of a federal 
bankruptcy court to remove a case from Louisiana state court on the 
ground that the plaintiff’s state cause of action was completely precluded 
by the bankruptcy court’s prior judgment on a federal question.  The 
Fifth Circuit had affirmed the denial of remand, citing Federated 
Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie128 for the proposition that a defendant 
could remove a case “where a plaintiff files a state cause of action 
completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a question of 
federal law.”129  The Supreme Court in Rivet reversed the appellate 
court, emphasizing that “Moitie did not create a preclusion exception to 
the rule, fundamental under currently governing legislation, that a 
defendant cannot remove on the basis of a federal defense.”130  
Moreover, the Court observed: 
In sum, claim preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a 
defensive plea that provides no basis for removal under § 1441(b). 
Such a defense is properly made in the state proceedings, and the state 
courts’ disposition of it is subject to this Court’s ultimate review.131 
Had the Court stopped there, it would have brought some clarity to the 
law.  Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg then proceeded to add an 
accompanying footnote to the sentence emphasizing the importance of 
deference to the state court in federal claim preclusion cases.  “We note 
also,” she said, seemingly in passing, that under the relitigation 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, a federal court 
may enjoin state-court proceedings “where necessary . . . to protect or 
effectuate its judgments.”132 
The footnote has proved pernicious.  Before Syngenta, the Eighth 
Circuit cited the Rivet footnote as some support for invoking the All 
 
 127. 522 U.S. 470 (1998). 
 128. 452 U.S. 394 (1981). 
 129. Rivet v. Regions Bank, 108 F.3d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 130. Rivet, 522 U.S. at 478. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 478 n.3. 
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Writs Act to remove a case otherwise subject to being enjoined under the 
relitigation exception to § 2283.133  Ginsburg’s footnote in Rivet, the 
Eighth Circuit opined, merely “points out another procedural option, but 
we do not read footnote three to rule out the one we approved.”134  By 
suggesting that deference to the state court is one—but not the only—
option available to a federal court in a federal claim preclusion case, the 
Rivet footnote adds uncertainty to the law, just as the Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in Syngenta similarly clouds the water.  All of this 
is to say that we must wait for another day to learn how the Court 
balances the competing priorities of minimizing interference with state 
judicial proceedings against the felt need on some occasions for federal 
judicial authority to restrain the prosecution of coordinate state 
proceedings. 
C. Lessons from Syngenta and Stephenson 
I have not endeavored to suggest a complete framework to guide 
the Court in balancing these competing priorities.  Still, by closely 
examining the strategic decision-making by litigants and their lawyers in 
Syngenta and Stephenson and assessing how that behavior exerted an 
influence on judicial decision-making in the cases, this study suggests 
some insights relevant to defining reasonable parameters for the federal 
judicial injunctive authority.  While federalism interests are one 
important aspect of the problem, Syngenta and Stephenson stand as 
testimony that there are other considerations that bear important 
relevance on how those limits are defined.  Given the fact specific 
character of all litigation, complex or otherwise, no comprehensive list is 
possible of all relevant variables but several significant factors are worth 
emphasizing. 
One important consideration in the class action context is the power 
of the federal district court to enjoin nonresident absent class members.  
While the failure of a class member to opt out of (at least some) Rule 
23(b)(3) actions is a necessary condition if she otherwise lacks minimum 
contacts with the forum where the class certification order was 
entered,135 a failure to opt-out is not a sufficient condition for exercising 
territorial jurisdiction over her if the minimum procedural due process 
requirements of Shutts are not satisfied.  Where a nonresident class 
 
 133. NAACP v. Metro. Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 
(1998). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
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member is beyond the territorial reach of the forum, her right to 
collaterally attack the certifying court’s judgment on procedural due 
process grounds is protected by constitutional limits on personal 
jurisdiction, just as any nonresident defendant may challenge a judgment 
entered without proper jurisdiction.136  Consequently, an injunction by a 
federal district judge against a nonresident class member’s collateral 
attack in a distant forum should not succeed unless the absent class 
member otherwise possesses sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum state.  To permit an injunction without sufficient minimum 
contacts would, in effect, read into the All Writs Act (the source of the 
district court’s injunctive authority) nationwide territorial jurisdictional 
authority to bind all persons from challenging the court’s judgment, 
without regard to their lack of minimum contacts with the forum.  Yet, 
as Professor Monaghan has argued:  
[T]he All Writs Act cannot properly be read to side-step standard tests 
governing in personam jurisdiction. . . . [None of the Court’s prior 
precedents provide a basis] for believing that the Act should be 
construed as a general ‘emergency all purpose’ nationwide long-arm 
statute used to relax the requirements of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) whenever a 
court deems that result desirable.137 
A second important consideration in addressing the scope of the 
federal judicial injunctive authority is to distinguish between occasions 
where the state suit is brought before judgment has been rendered in the 
federal forum, from cases where the jurisdiction is concurrent and 
overlapping with ongoing proceedings.  While the case law already 
recognizes this distinction, as noted earlier,138 we would do well to 
provide a more complete account to explain why the two circumstances 
pose different challenges and issues. 
When the second suit is brought after judgment, we are squarely 
faced with the question left unanswered from Syngenta: issuance of an 
injunction before the state court rules on the preclusive effect of a prior 
federal judgment or deference to the state court to make that 
determination without interference.  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
 
 136. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996).  A person “is not bound by a 
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not 
been made a party by service of process”  Id. at 798 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 
(1940)).  “The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of 
voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger”  Id. at 800 n.5 (quoting Chase Nat. Bank v. 
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)). 
 137. Monaghan, supra note 11, at 1190-91. 
 138. See supra notes 21-22. 
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opinion offers no express guidance on this choice, in considering the 
propriety of injunctive relief it is important to keep in mind the strenuous 
assertions made by defendants—ultimately accepted by the district judge 
and Eleventh Circuit, and not contradicted by the Supreme Court—that 
the Henson plaintiffs’ state suit in Iberville Parish was a direct threat to 
the prior settlement in Price.139  Moreover, with the state suit having 
been brought by the same lawyer against the same defendant for the 
same injuries for which the same plaintiffs were compensated by the 
federal settlement, it hardly seems surprising that the Supreme Court 
suggested an anti-suit injunction would have been warranted.  
Recognition of this point might lead us in future cases, where less 
baggage accompanies the state suit, to ask whether there are credible 
reasons to doubt that the state court can correctly interpret the preclusive 
effect of the prior federal judgment.  Lacking any such credible basis, I 
suggest that the presumption ought to be that the state judge is 
competent to get it right.140 
Additionally, when suit is brought after judgment it is important to 
distinguish a single state case being brought from instances where the 
state suit is one of several or many other suits filed.  In this latter 
circumstance there may be sound reasons for being concerned, as the 
Seventh Circuit was in Bridgestone/Firestone II, that “[r]elitigation can 
turn even an unlikely outcome into reality”141 and thereby justify on 
efficiency and fairness grounds the imposition of an injunction 
precluding multiple efforts at relitigation. 
When the second suit is brought before final judgment in another 
forum, other considerations are involved.  Usually, the assertion made to 
justify an anti-suit injunction is that the parallel state case threatens the 
federal court’s ability to do its job.142  In these circumstances, it is 
important to keep in mind the judge’s role in carefully scrutinizing the 
 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes10-11.  See also Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 
527 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (petitioners arguing that the Henson state suit “frustrated the express terms 
of the [federal] settlement”). 
 140. The Court’s oft-cited preference for avoiding interfering with state judicial proceedings, 
see supra notes 117-18, supports application of a high presumption of competency before 
intervention is justified, even if the Court’s decision in Parsons Steel does incentivize litigants to 
secure injunctive relief from the federal court before the state court has ruled.  See Wood, supra 
note 120, at 306 (observing that “[t]he first consequence [of Parsons Steel] totally ignores the 
comity and federalism basis of the Anti-Injunction Act, and the second comes close to violating 
principles underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); see also Hoffman, supra note 13, at 454 
(commenting that “the decision in Parsons Steel is anomalous because it permits—indeed, even 
encourages—litigants to seek injunctive relief before exhausting all other available remedies”). 
 141. Bridgestone/Firestone II, 333 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 142. See supra authorities cited in notes 113-14. 
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threat that the state suit allegedly poses to the ongoing proceedings.  For 
instance, the court can compare the pleadings: are the claims identical or 
only overlapping?  It may also compare the parties in the different suits: 
are the same parties involved or are the plaintiffs and the injuries for 
which they seek recovery distinct?  What about the lawyers?  Are the 
same counsel involved in all of the cases?143  The need for close scrutiny 
of the relatedness of claims and parties and why these considerations are 
so critical to the evaluation of the scope of the federal judicial injunctive 
authority may be illustrated by a personal story. 
When I was in private practice, I represented a couple who brought 
suit in state court in Texas against a life insurance company for recovery 
of gift taxes they had incurred in reliance on the company’s 
representations in connection with the sale of a life insurance policy.  
The policy was owned by a legal trust that the insurance company 
advised my clients to set up.  The gift taxes were the result of annual 
payments made to the trust to cover the costs of the premiums for the 
policy.  Prior to the filing of this suit, claims were already being asserted 
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
on behalf of all owners of insurance policies, one of whom was the legal 
trust my clients had set up.  Not unexpectedly, the defendant removed 
the Texas state suit to the Southern District of Texas and then moved to 
have it transferred to the federal court in California, asserting that the 
claims brought by my clients were identical to and redundant of those 
being litigated in that class action.  Before the federal judge in 
California, defendant sought dismissal of my client’s claims and to 
enjoin them from seeking recovery outside of the class proceedings. 
Ultimately, we prevailed in convincing the court that my clients did 
not come within the class definition and that their claims were distinct 
from and not covered by the claims being asserted in that case.  The 
point of this story, however, is not that we were ultimately right (we 
were, of course); rather it is to emphasize how high the stakes were in 
these pretrial battles.  Everything turned on how the court interpreted the 
relatedness of the claims being asserted.  Had we lost and been 
consolidated into the class litigation, it is unlikely that my clients would 
have received the same (or perhaps any of the) relief that they sought out 
of the class litigation. 
This anecdotal evidence is consistent with the broader empirical 
 
 143. For a critical look at the policy debates that underlie aggregation of related cases, see 
Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 
231 (1991). 
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evidence we have regarding mass litigation.  From both the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s perspective, relatedness of claims and of parties marks 
the decisive pretrial struggle in many complex litigation cases.  Figures 
from the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, as reported by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, reflect that from 
October 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002, a request to the Panel for 
transfer was made, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, in 7,258 civil actions 
and that in 7,063 of these cases transfer was ordered.  Transfer was not 
ordered in only 195 actions (or less than three percent).144  These striking 
figures reflect no short term trend.145  Furthermore, we also know from 
the federal experience that after a case is assigned to a pretrial court for 
consolidated or coordinated pretrial purposes it almost never is 
remanded to the trial court.  From its inception in 1968 through 
September 30, 2002, there were 179,071 civil action cases  consolidated 
for pretrial purposes under § 1407 (or originally filed in the transferee 
court and thereby became part of the MDL proceedings).  Of these 
179,071 cases, 129,594 were terminated by the transferee court; only 
10,381 actions were ever remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings (or “reassigned,” if the case was sent back to a court within 
the same district), resulting in a remand to pretrial termination ratio of 
less than six percent.146 
 
 144. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 26 
(2002).  Even these figures probably overstate the grant to denial rate on transfer motions since the 
Administrative Office’s figure of 195 reflects those cases where the Panel “did not order transfer” 
and does not distinguish between those instances in which transfer was denied and those in which 
the motion for transfer was withdrawn by the parties, following settlement or other voluntary 
disposition. 
 145. In his discussion of the federal MDL practice, Earle Kyle has noted that “in 1995 the 
Panel transferred 12,768 cases . . . for inclusion in coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, 
and declined to transfer only 84 actions.”  See Earle F. Kyle, IV, The Mechanics of Motion Practice 
Before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 589, 590 (1998) (citing REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 31-32 & tables S-21 and S-22 
(1995)). 
 146. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 144, at S-19 and S-20.  One might object that 
these figures are somewhat misleading since most cases generally in the civil system never reach 
trial.  This ignores, however, that once a case is consolidated into a MDL proceeding the pretrial 
dynamic of a case is dramatically altered.  Although good data does not exist to compare MDL and 
non-MDL cases, we do know from other empirical work that when plaintiff’s case is moved from 
the forum of its choosing to another, plaintiff’s win rate drops significantly.  See Kevin M. Clermont 
& Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1507 
(1995) (the plaintiffs’ win rate drops from 58% to 29% after successful transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a)); see also Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 
581 (1998) (empirical study demonstrates that removal significantly improves defendant’s win rate 
at trial as compared with cases where removal was unsuccessful). 
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In sum, this data regarding the federal multidistrict litigation 
experience with 28 U.S.C. § 1407 underscores how critical is a court’s 
determination concerning relatedness of claims and parties.  By 
recognizing the evaluative responsibility courts bear in making these 
determinations, we are reminded of the need not only for adequate 
procedures to be applied in particular cases but also for appropriate 
doctrinal rules governing coordinate litigation.  If the parties are not 
properly incentivized to present all relevant information to the court and 
to adequately represent those they purport to represent, then there is a 
need for rules to ensure due process protections are afforded.  After all, 
even the most capable of jurists on our state and federal benches cannot 
be expected to reach the right conclusions if the information presented to 
them is incomplete or otherwise inadequate. 
When the trial judge fails to carry out his evaluative responsibilities 
in overseeing the conduct of the litigation, we can expect unfortunate 
outcomes.  In Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank,147 the Seventh 
Circuit heard an appeal from a district court’s order approving a 
settlement of consumer-finance class action litigation.  Taxpayers 
entitled to a refund from the federal government must usually wait 
several weeks before receiving it.  Recognizing that some do not want to 
wait this long, H & R Block and Beneficial offered to lend customers the 
amount of the refund.  In exchange for lending this money, the customer 
was charged a significant interest rate, even on loans as short as a couple 
of days.  The most serious charge plaintiffs leveled at the defendants, 
according to the Seventh Circuit, was that H & R Block led customers to 
believe that they were acting as the customer’s agent or fiduciary when, 
in fact and without disclosure, H & R Block shared in the loan 
proceeds.148 
Numerous suits were filed, starting in 1990, against Beneficial and 
H & R Block and while many were dismissed several remained pending 
by the late 1990s.  Though none had yet gone to trial, one class action in 
Texas had been certified and was fast approaching its trial date.  In that 
suit, plaintiffs sought damages of nearly $2 billion.  While the case was 
still pending, two lawyers who had previously brought unsuccessful 
cases against Beneficial and H & R Block had lunch with Beneficial’s 
lead counsel.  At this lunch, they apparently began to discuss (though no 
formal negotiations took place) a global settlement of all claims, 
including claims against H & R Block.  Adding a few reinforcements, 
 
 147. 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 148. Id. at 280. 
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the same lawyers thereafter filed several new class action suits, 
including one in United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois.  After a brief period of negotiation and procedural maneuvering, 
a settlement was reached and submitted to the federal district judge to 
approve. 
The settlement contemplated that Beneficial and H & R Block 
would create a $25 million fund to pay all claims.  Several objectors 
strenuously opposed the settlement, arguing that the agreement was a 
sham, a kind of “reverse auction” whereby “the defendant in a series of 
class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a 
settlement with in the hope that the district court will approve a weak 
settlement that will preclude other claims against the defendant.”149  
Despite obvious conflicts of interest within the class, the district judge 
approved the settlement and, in the process, also encouraged the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers not to file their fee applications publicly.  The district 
judge also enjoined the Texas suit on the theory that the suit might derail 
the federal settlement.  The Seventh Circuit reversed. 
Writing for the panel, Judge Posner described the factual 
background that led to the settlement.  While he observed that “there is 
no proof that the settlement was actually collusive in the reverse-auction 
sense,” he also concluded: 
[T]he circumstances demanded closer scrutiny than the district judge 
gave it.  He painted with too broad a brush, substituting intuition for 
the evidence and careful analysis that a case of this magnitude, and 
settlement proposal of such questionable antecedents and 
circumstances, required.150 
Further, the appellate court found it remarkable, “in view of the progress 
and promise of the Texas suit relative to the half-hearted efforts of the 
settlement class counsel,” that the district judge enjoined prosecution of 
the Texas case.151  Posner continued: 
The effect of the injunction is that the settlement release, if upheld, 
would release the claims in the Texas suit.  For this release of 
potentially substantial claims against H & R Block, the settlement class 
received no consideration.  In fact the settlement class received no 
consideration for the release of any claims against Block . . . . The 
lawyers for the settlement class were richly rewarded for negotiations 
 
 149. Id. at 282 (citing, inter alia, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 392 (2000)). 
 150. Id. at 283. 
 151. Id. 
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that greatly diminished the cost of settlement to Beneficial from the 
level that it had considered to be in the ballpark years earlier when the 
cases were running more in its favor than when the settlement 
agreement was negotiated.  In effect, the settlement values the Texas 
and all other claims against Block at zero.152 
In Beneficial, as it has done in several other cases,153 the Seventh 
Circuit described the role of the district judge in reviewing the fairness 
of any proposed settlement in class litigation as “a fiduciary to the class, 
who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of 
fiduciaries.”154  Other circuits have similarly emphasized the fiduciary 
obligations owed by the district judge to the class members.155 
Sensible opinions, like Posner’s in Beneficial, stress the evaluative 
responsibility courts bear in overseeing litigant behavior.  The story of 
the Beneficial litigation helps make the point that doctrinal safeguards 
are important but, standing alone, are also insufficient.  We know from 
empirical evidence that the influence of objectors in reducing collusive 
behavior is limited since objectors are rather infrequent participants in 
class litigation;156 and even when they are involved, there is often no 
alignment between the interests of objectors (who often will settle for a 
quick payoff) and those of the absent class.157  Even the right to 
collateral attack itself has a marginal policing effect since, as noted 
earlier, such challenges are rarely brought and even less often are 
successful.158At the end of the day, all of the debate over doctrinal law 
will amount to little if the fiduciary obligations of trial judges in 
monitoring litigants and the litigation before them are not taken 
seriously. 
 
 152. Id. at 283-84. 
 153. Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2002); Stewart v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 154. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 280. 
 155. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001); Grant v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 156. See Thomas E. Willging, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the 
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 140 (1996) (in examination of fairness hearings in 
four federal judicial districts, there were no objectors in 42-64% of the cases). 
 157. The Advisory Committee Notes to the most recent amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure emphasize the not infrequent disconnect between the objectors’ interests 
and those of absent class members.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Advisory Committee Notes (“Such 
objections [by objectors that the proposed settlement is not fair, reasonable, or adequate on grounds 
that apply generally to a class or subclass], which purport to represent class-wide interests, may 
augment the opportunity for obstruction or delay.”); see also Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, 
Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1104-12 (1996). 
 158. See Woolley, supra note 60, at 443. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In closing, we may reflect on how remarkable it is that the Supreme 
Court over these last two terms has wrestled with the problem of 
defining the scope of the federal power to enjoin state proceedings.  
Outside observers might be excused for thinking that the boundaries 
would have been decided long ago. After all, more than two centuries 
have elapsed since the establishment of our dual system of state and 
federal courts and one need hardly doubt that “our fractured 
jurisdictional mosaic,” to use Bob Cover’s apt description,159 has offered 
myriad occasions for the Court to address the parameters of federal 
judicial injunctive power over state courts.  Certainly those early 
legislators who enacted the Anti-Injunction Act in 1793 must have 
expected that their tightly-drawn statute would have helped to squarely 
set boundaries between state and federal courts.  Yet, while the Court 
has taken up the proper application of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 on many 
occasions and some clear boundaries have been drawn, it is beyond cavil 
that the scope of federal judicial power to enjoin parallel state 
proceedings or a subsequently filed state suit has remained a subject of 
much uncertainty for the better part of two centuries. 
In the foreseeable future we will continue to face difficult and 
important questions about how to handle jurisdictional conflicts between 
state and federal courts.  When may—or, for that matter, when must—
state judges be relied upon to vindicate prior federal orders and/or to 
protect the integrity of ongoing proceedings?  Alternatively, when is it 
appropriate not to rely on the state court to adequately protect federal 
jurisdiction and, instead, to issue injunctive relief to enjoin litigants from 
pursuing parallel or subsequent state litigation? 
While the Court has emphasized the role that federalism principles 
play in defining the limits of the federal judicial injunctive power, these 
doctrinal guideposts should not cause us to overlook the important role 
of strategic decision-making by litigants and their lawyers and how that 
behavior, in turn, influences judicial decision-making.  Taken together, 
Syngenta and Stephenson suggest that we must be more conscious of the 
incentives and disincentives that guide the decision to bring parallel or 
subsequent litigation.  The assumptions we make that support the trust 
we ascribe to judgments are relevant if we ever hope to reach principled 
answers to the important questions that remain, unanswered and 
provocatively, in the uncertain aftermath of Syngenta and Stephenson. 
 
 159. Cover, supra note 4, at 640-41. 
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